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ASHES TO ASHES: A WAY HOME FOR 
CLIMATE CHANGE SURVIVORS 
Kenneth S. Klein* 
“Wow! Yet another big storm heading to Puerto Rico. Will it ever end?” 
-Twitter post of President Donald Trump, August 27, 20191 
 
In 2020, the United States suffered a record number of named storms, a record 
number of storms causing $1 billion or more in damage, a derecho that destroyed 
much of Iowa’s corn crop, and previously unheard-of levels of wildfire frequency 
and damage in California, Oregon, and Washington. The effects of climate change 
are causing a crisis of affordable, available homeowner insurance. As more and 
more homes in the United States are in high-risk areas for natural catastrophes, 
insurers increasingly choose not to offer insurance at all in some communities, 
exclude disaster risks from coverage in others, and dramatically raise prices in still 
others. For ever-growing numbers of homeowners, the only option is an inadequate 
and unattractive public insurance product of last resort. As a result, growing 
numbers of climate change survivors are finding there is no way home. 
Building on three recent proposals from regulators and prominent academics to 
solve the problem of affordability and availability, this Article provides a novel 
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solution: first, establish a requirement that an insurer who offers homeowner 
hazard insurance anywhere in a state must offer it everywhere, with no exception—
full stop. Second, adopt state rules providing that rate filings or form filings for 
homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance would exclude 
any natural disaster peril. Third, adopt state rules providing that rate filings for 
homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance discriminates 
against homes based on the location of the home.  
By building a set of market incentives to sell affordable, comprehensive insurance 
everywhere and protecting insurers from price-cutting by competitors, insurance 
will be affordable everywhere and will be available everywhere. Insurers will want 
to sell it, and homeowners will be able to buy it. And virtually all homes in the United 
States will have access to affordable insurance for the next peril, regardless of what 
it may be. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As natural disasters grow in frequency and impact, there is a crisis of 
available and affordable homeowner insurance in the United States. Reports abound 
of insurers refusing to sell insurance at any price in some communities and 
exploding the price of insurance in other communities.2 No solution has yet 
emerged. As a result, the victims and survivors of climate change lack the resources 
to rebuild and re-insure the homes they lost. This Article proposes an architecture 
for restructuring insurance markets so that even as natural catastrophes multiply, 
there is a viable avenue to homeowner insurance that insurers can and will sell, and 
that homeowners can and will buy. 
The problem is an insurance crisis, not an insurer crisis. Insurers are neither 
charities nor churches. Insurers do not exist to promote either social justice or 
morality. Rather, insurers are acting exactly as they need to act to be profitable 
businesses.3 Insurers will not intentionally sell actuarially unsound homeowner 
insurance. And so in the homeowner hazard insurance market, just as with any other 
 
 2. See, e.g., Susan Salisbury, Storm Season on the Horizon, Insurance Market in 
Crisis as Homeowners Face Huge Increases, PALM BEACH POST (May 7, 2021), https://www.
palmbeachpost.com/story/news/local/2021/05/07/insurance-market-crisis-homeowners-
face-double-digit-increases/4977002001/ [https://perma.cc/6747-CL69] (“Florida 
homeowners are being hit with double-digit percentage insurance rate increases, and the 
insurance market has reached a crisis stage.”); Amy O’Connor, Citizens’ CEO: Florida 
Property Insurance Market is Shutting Down, INS. J. (March 19, 2021), 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2021/03/19/606052.htm [https://perma.
cc/EY6E-AUT6] (“Florida’s insurer of last resort . . . has become the insurer of first resort as 
. . . the private homeowners insurance market continues its downward spiral. . . . [F]our 
companies in Florida are now closed for new business; at least 12 companies have strict 
underwriting restrictions . . . . [C]arriers are offsetting their losses with rate increases.”); Dale 
Kasler,  ‘Last Resort’ Insurance Plan Raising Rates for Rural California Homeowners—
Again, SACRAMENTO BEE (Dec. 8, 2020, 11:58 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/
california/fires/article247680725.html (“Thousands of rural Californians have lost 
homeowners’ insurance in recent years because of rising wildfire claims, forcing them to seek 
alternative coverage that’s two or three times more expensive. Now their rates are about to 
go even higher.”); Alicja Grzadkowska, Insurance for Properties in High-risk Wildfires 
Zones has ‘Dried Up’, INS. BUS. AM. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.
com/us/news/specialty-insurance/insurance-for-properties-in-highrisk-wildfires-zones-has-
dried-up-211128.aspx [https://perma.cc/U5CP-VTRX]. 
 3. See generally Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales 
Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1395, 1400–16 
(1994). 
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insurance market with highly variable risk profiles of potential insureds (for 
example, auto, life, or health insurance), an insurer who does not isolate high-risk 
insureds will not last long in the marketplace.4 For homeowners in areas prone to 
fire, flood, or other catastrophe risk, this means insurance is increasingly too 
expensive, if it is offered at all.5 Mitigation of climate change itself will help, as will 
mitigation of the risk to communities and homes (fire-hardening land and 
structures)—but not comprehensively enough, and not at a pace that will avert the 
insurance crisis.6 Nor is poor public insurance of last resort an adequate answer.7 
The necessity of ubiquitously and adequately insuring all natural disaster 
losses could not be more pressing (although it will probably be more pressing as 
soon as next year, no matter what year a reader is reading this). Aon, an international 
insurer, estimates that 2019 weather events (defined by Aon as flooding, tropical 
cyclone, severe weather, drought, wildfire, winter weather, earthquake, and EU 
windstorm) totaled $232 billion in economic losses (with slightly over half of 
insured losses occurring in the United States), which is actually slightly down from 
the twenty-first century average.8 These losses included a 69% global protection 
gap, meaning the gap between total economic insurable losses and total insured 
losses.9 Forty-one events caused at least $1 billion in losses, of which a dozen were 
billion-dollar insured loss events.10 In the United States, total economic losses were 
 
 4. See, e.g., Robert H. Jerry, II, Managing Hurricane (and Other Natural 
Disaster) Risk, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 391, 427, 447–52 (2019). 
 5. See infra note 17. 
 6. See generally Christopher C. French, America on Fire: Climate Change, 
Wildfires & Insuring Natural Catastrophes, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 817, 841–46 (2020). 
 7. See generally Arthur Charpentier & Benoit Le Maux, Natural Catastrophe 
Insurance: How Should the Government Intervene?, 115 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (2014); Report 
Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe 
Insurance in the United States, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (Sept. 2015), https://home.
treasury.gov/system/files/311/Natural%20Catastrophe%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
ZL8S-Y6QJ]; Christopher Flavelle, Can Insurance Protect Us from Climate Change, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 21, 2020, at D5 (“The obvious approach might be to let insurance work the way 
it’s meant to . . . . But homeowners vote.”); Chris Lafakis, Laura Ratz, Emily Fazio & Maria 
Cosma, The Economic Implications of Climate Change, MOODY’S ANALYTICS 11 (June 2019), 
https://www.moodysanalytics.com/-/media/article/2019/economic-implications-of-climate-
change.pdf [https://perma.cc/KW66-FX4Y] (“Every dollar that federal lawmakers 
appropriate for disaster relief is a dollar that could have otherwise been spent on Social 
Security, Medicare, national defense, or rebated as a tax cut. Natural disasters drain the federal 
government of resources and exacerbate the nation’s fiscal situation.”); see also Jim Saunders, 
Florida Leaders Try to Tame Soaring Property-insurance Premiums with Reform Bill, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL (Apr. 30, 2021, 4:59 PM), https://www.orlandosentinel.com/
business/real-estate/os-bz-property-insurance-changes-florida-20210430-ojpyun2b4jdujehx
nzrfxuclqq-story.html [https://perma.cc/Z8HA-GY6Z]. 
 8. Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, AON 3 (2020), 
http://thoughtleadership.aon.com/Documents/20200122-if-natcat2020.pdf?utm_source=
ceros&utm_medium=storypage&utm_campaign=natcat20 [https://perma.cc/DKG4-TGR9]. 
 9. Id. at 7; accord Facts + Statistics: Global Catastrophes, INS. INFO. INST., 
https://www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-global-catastrophes [https://perma.cc/5CNG-
TMG2] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 10. Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, supra note 8, at 1. 
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$68 billion, of which $36 billion were insured (again, with 2019 being a better than 
average year, down by 15% from twenty-first century averages).11 In 2020, the 
losses in the United States returned to trending up: “Insured losses from major 
natural catastrophes totaled about $78 billion . . . [,] the fourth-largest total since 
2011 and about 17% higher than the 10-year average of $66.5 billion . . . .”12 
California “fire season” in 2020 essentially was the entirety of the year.13 As 
reported internally within the insurance industry, “2020 set a record for the number 
of U.S. catastrophic events. The 2020 catastrophes included 19 events with at least 
$1 billion in direct insured losses in the United States . . . .”14 
Simply put, the frequency, intensity, and economic consequences of natural 
disasters is bad and getting worse, both globally and domestically.15 It is a national 
problem.16 Insurance is seen as one of a very few possible tools to ameliorate the 
 
 11. Id. at 37. 
 12. Matthew Lerner, Insured Natural Catastrophe Losses Reached $78B in 2020: 
Report, BUS. INS. (Feb. 2, 2021), https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20210202/
NEWS06/912339524/Insured-natural-catastrophe-losses-reached-$78B-in-2020-Report-
Willis-Re [https://perma.cc/FB96-G5U5]. 
 13. Incidences, CAL. FIRE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2020/ [https://
perma.cc/N8PH-8CW7] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 14. P/C Insurers’ Net Income for 9 Months Fell 27% on Effects of Catastrophes, 
INS. J. (Feb. 9, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/02/09/600598.
htm [https://perma.cc/8967-J2ER]. 
 15. See, e.g., Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Overview, NOAA, 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/ [https://perma.cc/3SX2-EQNG] (last visited July 31, 
2021); Steve Jackson, Actuaries Climate Risk Index, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES ii (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/2020-01/ACRI.pdf [https://perma.cc/C844-
C86M]; Spring 2020 Data Update to the Actuaries Climate Index, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES 2, 
https://actuariesclimateindex.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/ACI-Press-Release-Dec-
2020-FINAL_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/25W9-M3V3] (last visited July 31, 2021). See 
generally W.J. Wouter Botzen et al., The Economic Impacts of Natural Disasters: A Review 
of Models and Empirical Studies, 13 REV. ENV’T ECON. & POL’Y 167 (2019); Stuart Fraser et 
al., The Making of a Riskier Future: How Our Decisions Are Shaping Future Disaster Risk, 
GLOB. FACILITY FOR DISASTER REDUCTION & RECOVERY, https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/
default/files/publication/Riskier%20Future.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CH2-LEPT] (last visited 
Aug. 23, 2021). 
 16. See, e.g., Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market 
for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 57 (“Every region of 
the United States is vulnerable to natural catastrophes. In general, the number of natural 
catastrophe events per year and the associated economic losses are increasing and, as a result, 
attention to natural catastrophe insurance programs has increased as well.”); 2020 Insurance 
Fact Book, INS. INFO. INST. 139––43 (2020), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/
insurance_factbook_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT5D-YRDS]; see also Kristina Dahl et al., 
Underwater: Rising Seas, Chronic Floods, and the Implications for Coastal Real Estate, 
UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 5 (2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/
2018/06/underwater-analysis-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TS8-69TD] (“By 2045 . . . 
nearly 311,000 of today’s residential properties, currently home to more than half a million 
people, would be at risk of flooding chronically . . . . For about 30 communities, properties 
accounting for more than half of the local property tax base today would be at risk by 2045.”); 
French, supra note 6, at 823 (and sources cited therein). 
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economic impacts of natural disasters, but at present, in many communities 
insurance for catastrophe is unaffordable or unavailable.17 
All human activity is subject to degradation by natural catastrophes.18 
Some (not all) of these impacts are insurable, meaning there is a private insurance 
policy of some type that will cover the loss; the potential coverages are manifold: 
life, disability, business interruption, health, real property, personal property, 
automobile, commercial, residential, and workers compensation, among others.19 
This Article confines its focus to insurance to reconstruct an owner-occupied home. 
In the twentieth century, privately insuring one’s home was not an issue. 
And for many, it still isn’t. Over the past 30 years, homeowner insurance never has 
accounted for even 1% of average household consumer spending.20 Take-up rates of 
homeowner insurance, meaning the percentage of possible insureds who actually 
purchase coverage, always has been above 90% of all homeowners.21 A steadily 
decreasing percentage of homeowners—by 2016, less than one-third—identify 
homeowner insurance as a financial burden.22 
Perhaps counter-intuitively, natural disasters have not yet overly stressed 
the profitability of private insurers. At the 2019 Spring National Meeting of the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”), at the same time that 
a representative of AIR Worldwide23 presented to the Catastrophe Risk Subgroup 
that in 2017 and 2018 wildfire losses dwarfed any prior year, Matt Mosher (Chief 
Operating Officer of AM Best) in his Comments on Wildfire Risk, described a 
financially healthy industry despite the high cost of catastrophe-related, covered 
losses: 
 
 17. See French, supra note 6, at 831–38 (and sources cited therein); The 
Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential Property 
Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of California: CDI 
Summary and Proposed Solutions, CAL. DEP’T INS. 1, 5 (2018), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/
0400-news/0100-press-releases/2018/upload/nr002-2018AvailabilityandAffordabilityof
WildfireCoverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/NZS7-SYM5]; The Potential Impact of Climate 
Change on Insurance Regulation, NAIC 4 (2008), https://content.naic.org/sites/
default/files/inline-files/cipr_potential_impact_climate_change.pdf [https://perma.cc/2W3C-
CT6X]. 
 18. See, e.g., Lafakis et al., supra note 7, at 4; Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate 
Adaptation: A Review of the Economic Costs of Natural Disasters, 46 ENERGY ECON. 576, 
577–78 (2014). 
 19. Kousky, supra note 18. 
 20. 2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 213. 
 21. See infra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 22. Homeowners Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, 
INS. INFO. INST. 3 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/pulse-wp-
020217-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5XJ-9JCL]. 
 23. AIR is a wholly owned subsidiary of Verisk, which also is the parent of the 
ISO. Form 10-K, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 4–5 (2020), http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0001442145/c43067a5-
c931-4f62-ae7c-4eefe875abcc.pdf [https://perma.cc/MAT4-U8J2]. The core competency of 
AIR is modeling catastrophe risk. Our Story, AIR, https://www.air-worldwide.com/about-
air/Our-Story/ [https://perma.cc/L3TQ-RDVS] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
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“Gross losses were below state-wide market share modeled 
estimates.” 
“Reinsurance responded appropriately.” 
The “vast majority of companies absorbed 2017 & 2018 losses 
without impact to ratings.” 
The “micro-concentration of risks led to a few negative rating 
actions.”24 
Even in the very difficult insurance environment of 2020—a pandemic, 
civil unrest, near-constant wildfires in the West,25 a derecho in the Midwest that 
destroyed much of Iowa’s corn crop,26 and a record number of both named storms 
and over $1 billion of damage in the East27—Property and Casualty insurance did 
“surprisingly well,” was profitable, and projected continued profits in 2021.28 That 
 
 24. Matt Mosher, AM Best Comments on Wildfire Risk, NAIC 8 (Mar. 8, 2019), 
https://naic-cms.org/sites/default/files/national_meeting/cmte_e_cat_risk_sg_2019_spring_
nm_materials.pdf [https://perma.cc/QBE7-XG44]. 
 25. Incidences, supra note 13. 
 26. Iowa Derecho Claims Top $1.6 Billion, IOWA INS. DIV. (Nov. 9, 2020), 
https://iid.iowa.gov/press-releases/iowa-derecho-claims-top-16-billion [https://perma.cc/
R79J-TRRU]; Andrea May Sahouri, $7.5 Billion and Counting: August Derecho That 
Slammed Iowa Was Most Costly Thunderstorm in US History, Data Shows, DES MOINES REG. 
(Oct. 17, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/2020/10/17/
iowas-august-derecho-most-costly-thunderstorm-us-history-7-5-billion-damages/36950
53001/ [https://perma.cc/46N9-T4FY]; Bob Henson, Iowa Derecho in August Was Most 
Costly Thunderstorm Disaster in U.S. History,  WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2020/10/17/iowa-derecho-damage-cost/?utm_
source=I.I.I.+Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=f6b9df9f0f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_
09_28_02_24_COPY_01&utm_medium=email [https://perma.cc/96MP-J3ME]; Rod 
Boshart, Derecho 2020: Insurance Pays Over $3 Billion in Derecho Claims to Iowans so Far, 
QUAD-CITY TIMES (Aug. 10, 2021), https://qctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/iowa/
derecho-2020-insurance-pays-over-3-billion-in-derecho-claims-to-iowans-so-far/article_
9ffed592-6d2e-5773-9eb3-b65ae56c7518.html [https://perma.cc/5DF6-GGAU]. 
 27. Record Number of Billion-dollar Disasters Struck U.S. in 2020, NOAA (Jan. 
8, 2021), https://www.noaa.gov/stories/record-number-of-billion-dollar-disasters-struck-us-
in-2020 [https://perma.cc/MW9Q-EFZY]. 
 28. Loretta Worters, Triple-I/Milliman Groundhog Day Report Projects Insurer 
Growth, Profits in 2021, INS. INFO. INST.: TRIPLE-I BLOG (Feb. 2, 2021), 
https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/triple-i-milliman-groundhog-day-report-projects-
insurer-growth-profits-in-2021/ [https://perma.cc/N42Z-LALL]. To put this in more 
perspective, reinsurance is an important component to the ability and willingness of insurers 
to insure catastrophe risk. See generally Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State 
of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 4; 
Alejandro Drexler & Richard Rosen, Exposure to Catastrophe Risk and Use of Reinsurance: 
An Empirical Evaluation for the U.S., SPRINGER LINK (Sept. 23, 2020), 
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41288-020-00186-3 (posting by Geneva Ass’n on 
Risk & Insurance: Issues & Practice for open access). In 2021, Bermuda insurers and 
reinsurers asserted, “Bermuda is the largest supplier of catastrophe reinsurance to US 
insurers.” Why Bermuda, ASSOC. BERMUDA INSURERS & REINSURERS, https://www.abir.bm/
why-bermuda/ [https://perma.cc/3UZB-PPHQ] (last visited Mar. 12, 2021). In 2020, 
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said, while in the first three quarters of 2020 Property and Casualty insurance 
remained profitable, net underwriting income (as opposed to income from 
investment return) dropped 27%.29 Nonetheless, industry observers projected Year 
2021 to have continued underwriting profitability.30 
But maintaining industry profitability has come at a price to homeowners. 
In an August 20, 2019 press release entitled FACT SHEET: Impact of Wildfires on 
Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability, the California Department of Insurance 
(“CDI”) described how, in response to wildfires in 2017, California private fire 
insurance for homes was becoming unaffordable, if available at all.31 In the fall of 
2020, the California Insurance Commissioner doubled down on these concerns, 
convening a “Virtual Investigatory Hearing on Homeowners’ Insurance Availability 
and Affordability.”32 The Washington Insurance Commissioner discussed 
catastrophe and its impact on insurance affordability and availability in his opening 
remarks in his Climate 2020 Summit in October.33 The Louisiana Insurance 
Commissioner was quoted in November of 2020 saying he expected homeowner 
insurance rates to rise 5%–10% because of the year’s hurricane experience.34 In 
2021, Floridians faced double-digit insurance premium increases, even in the 
absence of major storms hitting Florida during the hurricane season of 2020.35 This 
 
“Bermuda’s reinsurance sector was hit by more catastrophe losses than costs from the 
COVID-19 pandemic . . . .” Steve Evans, Catastrophes Outweigh Pandemic Losses for 
Bermuda Reinsurers in 2020, ARTEMIS (Mar. 11, 2021), 
https://www.artemis.bm/news/catastrophes-outweigh-pandemic-losses-for-bermuda-
reinsurers-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/Y9GX-U945]. 
 29. P/C Insurers’ Net Income for 9 Months Fell 27% on Effects of Catastrophes, 
supra note 14. 
 30. Déjà Vu: P/C Insurance Challenges for 2021 Look Much Like 2020’s, Says 
AM Best, INS. J. (Feb. 25, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2021/02/
25/602819.htm [https://perma.cc/8RHW-LRZ9]. 
 31. Fact Sheet: Impact of Wildfires on Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability, 
CAL. DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2019/upload/
nr063_factsheetwildfire.pdf [https://perma.cc/B84E-UR8L] (last visited July 30, 2021). 
 32. Invitation to Virtual Investigatory Hearing on Homeowners’ Insurance 
Availability and Affordability, CAL. DEP’T INS. 1 (Sept. 16, 2020), http://www.insurance.
ca.gov/01-consumers/200-wrr/upload/Invitation-to-Virtual-Investigatory-Hearing-on-
Homeowners-Insurance-Availability-and-Affordability.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WSZ-NJ33]. 
 33. Washington State Office of the Insurance Commissioner, Climate Summit 
2020 - Opening Remarks: Washington State Insurance Commissioner Mike Kreidler, 
YOUTUBE (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kJan_Nt3uSQ. 
 34. Thanh Truong, Homeowners Insurance Rates Could Rise 10% After Disaster-
heavy 2020, 4WWL (Nov. 6, 2020, 11:48 AM) https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/local/
homeowners-insurance-rates-could-rise-10-next-year-after-disaster-heavy-2020/289-290b
247b-7524-4b28-9077-8a91bce78d1a [https://perma.cc/4RDC-BHK6]. 
 35. Suzanne Barlyn, Florida Consumers ‘Flabbergasted’ as Property Insurers 
Push for Double-digit Rate Hikes, REUTERS (Feb. 12, 2021, 4:09 AM), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-usa-insurance-florida/florida-consumers-flabbergasted-as-property-insurers-
push-for-double-digit-rate-hikes-idUSKBN2AC111 [https://perma.cc/X3MJ-AZBD]. 
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phenomenon is being felt in the Midwest as well.36 More and more insurers are 
shedding entire communities of homes from their portfolios and dramatically raising 
premiums on others.37 These insurers leave homeowners with no choice but to be 
uninsured or to purchase public insurance of last resort (which typically has less 
coverage and higher cost).38 The Insurance Information Institute characterizes this 
reliance on government programs as an “unsustainable” response to natural 
disasters.39 
This Article describes three recent, smart proposals to resolve the 
homeowner insurance crisis. In 2018, the CDI published a proposed legislative 
package addressing affordability by essentially requiring homeowners to build 
fortified homes, and addressing availability by regulatory oversight to make sure 
insurers fairly “score” a wildfire risk.40 Also in 2018, Professor Howard Kunreuther 
proposed that states refuse rate filings other than “All Perils” insurance,41 and that 
price inequity be resolved through state-funded vouchers.42 And in 2020, Professor 
Christopher French argued that the solution is a government-run, national, 
undistorted43 All Perils insurance that essentially would be the spiritual homeowner-
insurance equivalent of the United Kingdom’s National Health Service.44 
The challenge of these differing approaches is there is reason for concern 
about whether any actually can work. The CDI proposal does not address any peril 
other than fire, and does not offer any reason to believe that mitigation can solve 
 
 36. See Khalil Maycock, What Is a Non-renewal Insurance Notice and Why Do 




 37. See, e.g., James Bikales, Can ‘Fire Hardening’ Solve California’s Home 




[https://perma.cc/ZV25-WQ5M]; accord Howard Kunreuther, All-Hazards Homeowners 
Insurance: Challenges and Opportunities, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 141, 145–46 (2018) 
(describing private insurers pulling out of Florida and California following hurricanes and 
earthquakes, respectively). 
 38. See generally Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the 
Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 14–15, 18–
26. 
 39. Flood: Beyond Risk Transfer, INS. INFO. INST. (Apr. 29, 2021), 
https://www.iii.org/white-paper/flood-beyond-risk-transfer-042921/ [https://perma.cc/5TAJ-
W2YW]. 
 40. The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential 
Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of 
California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 6–11. 
 41. All Perils insurance is insurance for any weather peril, without exclusion of 
coverage of, for example, flood or earthquake damage. 
 42. Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 141, 147–52. 
 43. Undistorted means that cost is averaged across high-risk and low-risk 
communities, rather than isolating homes for cost purposes into high-risk pools. 
 44. Cf. French, supra note 6, at 817–18. 
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affordability in high-risk communities. Kunreuther offers no structural mechanism 
to assure either affordability or availability in high-risk communities. French’s 
proposal gives no guidance or real expectation that it could navigate the political 
headwinds of an industry that has no wish to be supplanted. 
This Article offers a three-point proposal that addresses all these concerns: 
first, require that an insured who offers homeowner hazard insurance anywhere in a 
state must offer it everywhere, with no exception—full stop. Second, adopt state 
rules providing that rate filings45 or form filings (proposed allowed insurance forms) 
for homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance would 
exclude any natural disaster peril from its coverage. Third, adopt state rules 
providing that rate filings for homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if 
the insurance discriminates against homes based on the location of the home. 
This architecture is not a flight of fancy; it is politically realistic and 
recognizes the business necessities of insurance companies. And it structures a 
private market that protects insurers from price-cutting competitors who either 
exclude risks or price risk by isolating some communities into high-risk pools. 
Consequently, All Perils coverage priced in broad, undistorted risk pools becomes a 
highly profitable product. 
Nor is this proposal a panacea. While it will dramatically lower insurance 
costs for insureds in high-risk communities, it will raise premiums slightly on the 
rest of insureds. And this is just one of the political pressure points that this proposal 
will have to navigate. 
But in the end, the perfect cannot be the enemy of the good. This proposal 
would result in insurance that will be affordable everywhere, available everywhere, 
marketable for insurers, and attractive to homeowners. 
Part I of this Article describes the premises on which this Article rests. Part 
II describes the current landscape (and inadequacies) of privately insuring U.S. 
homes for catastrophe. Part III describes hints of a solution that come from current 
market structures. Part IV describes extant proposals to make homeowner insurance 
for natural catastrophes affordable and available. Part V describes why those 
proposals likely won’t work. Part VI proposes for an architecture that could work. 
Part VII addresses some anticipated criticisms of the proposal of this Article. 
I. THE NECESSARY PREDICATES THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN 
ANY PROPOSED SOLUTION TO AFFORDABILITY/ACCOUNTABILITY 
There are three premises that must be accounted for by any proposal to 
address the crisis in affordability and availability of insurance. Each premise should 
be obvious and yet sometimes one or both are not considered. 
 
 45. A rate filing is any time an insurer defends and seeks state approval to sell a 
particular insurance-policy type at a particular price. 
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First, insurers are pulling out of markets only because they cannot operate 
profitably in those markets.46 Insurers are economic actors seeking profit and 
responding to incentives. In the United States, regulators and legislators should not 
and cannot force a private insurer to write coverage or to price risk at a loss. But if 
regulators or legislators construct a market that allows insurers to cover risk 
affordably and profitably, insurers will do so. It is a tautology that bears repeating 
occasionally: insurers want to sell as much insurance as they profitably can. Or put 
another way, there is no need to theorize about the efficacy of a proposed solution 
to the affordability and availability crisis that rests upon insurer behavior that 
insurers already can engage in. The market is its own test. If the solution works, then 
insurers already are doing it. Insurers want to sell insurance. 
Second, so long as insurers can have narrow, undistorted risk pools—in 
other words, separately priced insurance arranged into population cohorts based on 
levels of risk—“high risk” addresses will not have access to unsubsidized, 
affordable insurance.47 Numerously populated and highly heterogeneous risk pools 
result in lower premiums for (from an underwriting perspective) high-risk insureds 
and result in higher premiums for (from an underwriting perspective) low-risk 
insureds. Just as having affordable, available health insurance for historically 
unhealthy persons requires a risk pool with high take-up rates by “young healthies,” 
the affordability of hurricane insurance for Galveston, Texas will be advanced if: 
(1) Galveston is pooled with Amarillo, Texas and (2) take-up rates in Amarillo are 
high. But for this same reason, an insurer who does underwrite averaging hurricane 
risk in Galveston with Amarillo cannot compete. Other insurers will disaggregate 
Galveston and Amarillo addresses, thus selling to Amarillo cheaper, which will 
leave the first insurer with no choice but either to stop selling hurricane insurance in 
Galveston or dramatically raise the cost of insurance in Galveston. 
Third, any government restructuring of insurance markets has embedded, 
potentially controversial political-policy choices. Just as including contraception 
within the mandated coverages of the Affordable Care Act may simultaneously 
reflect sound public health policy and controversial political policy, so too will 
choices about insuring catastrophe, such as mandating that hazard insurance cover 
flood even though most homes are not in flood plains, reflect sound emergency 
 
 46. See, e.g., Amy O’Connor, Florida’s Property Insurance Market Is ‘Spiraling 
Towards Collapse’ Due to Litigation: Report, INS. J. (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.
insurancejournal.com/news/southeast/2021/01/20/598034.htm [https://perma.cc/6F2C-
LWX2] (“As capital and surplus deteriorates, companies lose the flexibility to be able to write 
additional business . . . that has consequences for the consumer.”); accord Tim Flanagan, Why 
Are Insurers Leaving the ACA Marketplace and what does it mean for Obamacare?, 
HEALTHCARE RECRUITERS INT’L (Oct. 25, 2016), https://hcrnetwork.com/insurers-leaving-
aca-marketplace-mean-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/7D9R-B4Y6] (“[A]ll three major 
insurers said they are losing money on the plans”). 
 47. See generally Risk Pooling: How Health Insurance in the Individual Market 
Works, AM. ACAD. ACTUARIES, https://www.actuary.org/content/risk-pooling-how-health-
insurance-individual-market-works-0 [https://perma.cc/5HDX-AV45] (last visited July 31, 
2021) (describing the dynamics of distorted and undistorted risk pooling in the context of the 
ACA); accord Issue Brief: Using High-Risk Pools to Cover High-Risk Enrollees, AM. ACAD. 
ACTUARIES, https://www.actuary.org/content/using-high-risk-pools-cover-high-risk-
enrollees [https://perma.cc/W6MC-WJQ9] (last visited July, 31, 2021). 
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planning policy but controversial political policy. Just as it may be politically 
controversial to mandate community pricing in health insurance that results in a 
healthy 20-year-old individual paying for some of the risk of an 80-year-old cancer 
patient, so too will it be politically controversial to price flood insurance so that 
some part of the cost of insuring luxury vacation homes on the coast is shared by 
homeowners insuring modest family homes far inland. 
Any proposed solution to homeowner insurance affordability and 
availability should either debunk or account for all three of these premises. 
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF PRIVATELY INSURING U.S. 
HOMES FOR CATASTROPHE 
Any proposal to reform the U.S. markets for private homeowner insurance 
must account for what insurance homeowners currently have and why they have it. 
In the current private homeowner insurance market, most but far from all owner-
occupied homes are required by a mortgage to carry insurance for catastrophe loss. 
The vast majority of those insurance policies routinely exclude flood and earthquake 
from covered peril. In broadest summary, roughly one-third of American 
homeowners have a choice whether to insure for fire and wind, ninety percent or 
more of homeowners have a choice whether to insure for flood, and essentially all 
homeowners have a choice whether to insure for earthquake. Voluntary take-up rates 
differ by peril. Understanding those differences is the foundation of remediating 
them. 
A. What Perils Are Insured 
In the United States, homeowner insurance generally defines coverage for 
catastrophe loss through the use of one of a handful of Insurance Services Office 
(“ISO”) policy forms.48 The HO-3 Special Form “is the most commonly purchased 
type of homeowner policy, accounting for 81.9% of all owner-occupied exposures 
countrywide in 2012.”49 The HO-3 Special Form covers all perils except “flood, 
earthquake, war, nuclear accident, intentional loss, collapse, mold, wear and tear, 
seepage, settling, and other perils specifically excluded.”50 Put simply, standard 
homeowner insurance covers fire and wind but not flood or earthquake.51 
 
 48. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 15––16. 
 49. Id. at 16 (citation omitted). 
 50. Id. at 17 (italics deleted from original). 
 51. See, e.g., Cassandra Stephenson, Who Pays for Flood Damage? Most Middle 
Tennesseans Don’t Have Flood Insurance., NASHVILLE TENNESSEAN (Mar. 30, 2021, 1:52 
PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2021/03/30/nashville-flood-most-standard-
insurance-policies-dont-cover-floods/7051238002/ [https://perma.cc/X63A-SA8X] 
(“Unfortunately, a lot of renters, a lot of homeowners assume that they are fully protected for 
all losses, but flood is always a separate coverage — it's always a separate policy,’ Mark 
Friedlander, spokesperson for the Insurance Information Institute, said . . . . ‘More than 95% 
of homeowners in the greater Nashville area do not have flood coverage,’ Friedlander said. 
Nationally, about 85% of U.S. homeowners are not protected against flood damage, though 
about 90% of natural disasters in the country involve flooding.”). And things might one day 
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There can be profound coverage implications to the coverage exclusion of 
flood and earthquake. By its terms, standard hazard insurance typically will allow 
an insured to opt for a coverage limit of the dwelling structure that describes the 
estimated full reconstruction cost (plus endorsements to cover the cost of intervening 
changes in building codes and possible post-disaster demand surge pricing), the loss 
of personal property, damage to landscaping and other structures, and alternative 
living expenses during the period the insured has lost the ability to live in the 
dwelling.52 Put another way, if a home is lost due to a covered peril, then the basic 
and intended design of a standard homeowner insurance with replacement coverage, 
in broad strokes, promises to fund the replacement of the home, the replacement of 
the stuff that was in the home, much of the cost of the replacement of things like 
landscaping and fencing outside of the home, and the cost of the homeowner living 
elsewhere while the home is being rebuilt. 
Flood insurance policies are less generous by design. Virtually all flood 
insurance is through the federal National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”). In the 
United States in 2018 there were 5,037,266 total NFIP policies (either directly 
written or under a private insurer’s name) representing $1.327 trillion of insurance 
in force, while by contrast the total of direct written premiums for all private insurers 
that year was $540,875.53 NFIP coverage for the reconstruction of the dwelling is 
capped at $250,000.54 Personal property loss also is covered and is capped at 
$100,000.55 There is no coverage for building code changes,56 alternative living 
expenses (the cost of the homeowner living elsewhere while the home is being 
rebuilt), or landscaping losses (replacing the fences, trees, etc., outside of the 
house).57 
 
get even worse for the homeowner. In the summer of 2019, the Oregon Division of Financial 
Regulation solicited input of the “recent trend[]” of “[s]ome homeowners’ . . . liability 
filings” that contained proposed “exclusions for losses resulting from wildfires . . . . defined 
broadly . . . .” E-mail from Alex Cheng, Senior Pol’y Analyst, Or. Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. 
Servs., to Author (June 17, 5:08 PM) (on file with author). The ODFR has rejected the filings, 
but that does not close the matter forever. 
 52. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 29. 
 53. Facts + Statistics: Flood Insurance, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-
statistic/facts-statistics-flood-insurance#Private%20Flood%20Insurance,%202016-2019 
[https://perma.cc/22J6-5MAH] (last visited July 31, 2020). An exemplar of an NFIP policy 
can be found at: https://www.fema.gov/pdf/nfip/manual201205/content/15_policy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CQM6-ZDVK]. 
 54.  National Flood Insurance Program Answers to Questions About the 
NFIP, FEMA 4 (Dec. 2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/f084_atq_
11aug11.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2NE-NDEX]. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Reconstruction beyond the home as it was built, where building codes 
have changed since the original construction and so now, to be code compliant, a different 
house needs to be built. 
 57. National Flood Insurance Plan Summary of Coverage, FEMA 4–5 (Aug. 
2020), https://www.fema.gov/sites/default/files/2020-09/fema_nfip-summary-coverage_jul
2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8J9-DYP3]. 
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Earthquake insurance, at least in California, is not less generous than 
standard hazard insurance, but it is a lot more expensive. It is difficult to know what 
percentage of earthquake insurance is private insurance or what that private 
insurance looks like nationally, but in California, almost all earthquake insurance is 
through public insurance programs such as the California Earthquake Authority.58 
Earthquake coverages look very much like those of a standard hazard homeowner 
policy but with higher premiums and higher deductibles.59 
There is wide variability of voluntary take-up rates between flood and 
earthquake insurance, on the one hand, and standard hazard insurance, on the other 
hand. Ideally, there would be broad take-up of flood insurance, because flooding is 
“the most common, destructive, and costly form of natural catastrophe in the United 
States.”60 In 2019, the aggregate estimated reconstruction costs of single-family 
residential homes at risk from storm surge in Gulf and Atlantic states totaled about 
$1.8 trillion.61 Through 2019, eight of the ten costliest disasters on record have been 
hurricanes, with the other two being the September 11 terrorist attacks (not a natural 
disaster) and the 1994 Northridge, California earthquake.62 According to the 
Insurance Information Institute (“I.I.I.”): 
Insured losses from hurricanes rose in the past 15 years as hurricane 
activity has intensified. When adjusted for inflation and after losses 
are tallied for the 2017 and 2018 hurricanes, nine of the 10 costliest 
hurricanes in U.S. history have struck since 2004. In addition to the 
increase in storm activity, construction along both the Gulf Coast and 
East Coast has continued to develop, and property values have 
increased, resulting in higher loss exposure.63  
Yet as of 2019, only 10–14% of owner-occupied homes in the United States 
were insured for flood.64 And 40% of owner-occupied homes insured for flood are 
required to have flood insurance,65 meaning less than 10% of owner-occupied homes 
are explicitly, voluntarily insuring for floods. 
 
 58. Earthquake Insurance, CAL. DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-
consumers/105-type/95-guides/03-res/eq-ins.cfm#basicearthquake [https://perma.cc/7Z7C-
YJ68] (last visited Aug. 23, 2021) (“The California Earthquake Authority (CEA) provides 
most earthquake insurance in California.”). 
 59. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 38–40. See generally CAL. 
EARTHQUAKE AUTH., https://www.earthquakeauthority.com/ [https://perma.cc/5CQ6-4468] 
(last visited July 31, 2021) (showing that earthquake insurance looks very much like a 
standard hazard homeowner policy). 
 60. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 27. 
 61. 2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 101. 
 62. Id. at 146. 
 63. Id. at 147. 
 64. Facts + Statistics: Flood Insurance, supra note 53; Homeowners Insurance: 
Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, supra note 22, at 5. 
 65. See Sarah Strochak et al., Too Many Homeowners Lack Flood Insurance, but 
Many Buy It Voluntarily, URB. INST. (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/too-
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While it is unknown precisely what percentage of homeowners required to 
have flood insurance would have voluntarily insured otherwise, adverse selection 
theorists would predict the answer to be “lots.” The facts on the ground belie this 
prediction. Outside of Special Flood Hazard Areas (areas where flood insurance is 
required to get a federally backed mortgage), “very few properties have a flood 
policy, even in areas at risk of flooding.”66 Even after a major flood, voluntary take-
up rates of flood insurance typically only increase by 1.5%.67 All of this suggests 
that voluntary take-up rates of flood insurance probably run slightly less than 10%. 
Earthquake insurance rarely is mandated.68 The CEO of the California 
Earthquake Authority is quoted as saying only 10% of Californians have earthquake 
insurance.69 Nationally the figure is 7%–8%.70 When Mary Kelly, Steven Bowen, 
and Glenn McGillivray studied why take-up rates of earthquake insurance are so 
dismal (in the United States, in contrast to Canada), they concluded that the likely 
explanation was something unique to the American psyche and attitudes about 
freedom and government.71 
However, standard hazard homeowner insurance is a horse of a different 
color. In broadest terms, more than 90% of American homeowners have basic 
homeowner hazard insurance. The public-facing data of the I.I.I. reports that 95% 
of owner-occupied homes have homeowner insurance.72 Marian Sassian, I.I.I.’s 
Research Director, reports that in the fall of 2018, 91% of homeowners said they 
had homeowner insurance, down slightly from 93% in 2016 and trending down since 
2011 when the figure was 97%.73 
 
many-homeowners-lack-flood-insurance-many-buy-it-voluntarily [https://perma.cc/6JXT-
BT94] (citing 2017 American Housing Survey Data, U.S.  CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2018/ahs.html [https://perma.cc/Z5R3-
R4M3]) (“Nationally, 40 percent of those who have flood insurance purchased it because it 
was required and 60 percent purchased it voluntarily.”). 
 66. Carolyn Kousky et al., Flood Risk and the U.S. Housing Market, 29 J. HOUS. 
RSCH. S3, S9 (2020). 
 67. Id. at S10–11; see Craig E. Landry et al., Willingness to Pay for Multi-Peril 
Hazard Insurance 21 (July 28, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3662668. 
 68. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 38 (citation omitted). 
 69. Nick Miller, Only 10 Percent of California Homes Are Covered By 
Earthquake Insurance, EMPIRE KVCR (July 9, 2019 11:49 AM), https://www.kvcrnews.
org/post/only-10-percent-california-homes-are-covered-earthquake-insurance#stream/0 
[https://perma.cc/X4B3-NHEU]. 
 70. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 39 fig.9; Homeowners Insurance: 
Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, supra note 22, at 6. 
 71. Mary Kelly et al., The Earthquake Insurance Protection Gap: A Tale of Two 
Countries, 39 J. INS. REG. 1, 22, 28 (2020). 
 72. Claire, How Many Homes are Insured? How Many are Uninsured?, INS. INFO. 
INST.: TRIPLE-I BLOG (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.iii.org/insuranceindustryblog/how-many-
homes-are-insured-how-many-are-uninsured/ [https://perma.cc/K5PN-JL4E]. 
 73. E-mail from Maria Sassian, Research Dir., Ins. Info. Inst., to Author (May 29, 
2020, 9:58 AM) (on file with author). 
694 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 63:1 
   
 
B. Theories of Variable Voluntary Take-Up Rates of Insured Perils 
The common explanation for the dramatically higher take-up rates of 
standard hazard insurance is that Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) 
and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) compliant mortgages 
require standard homeowner insurance.74 But from 2011–2018, only 59%–66% of 
homes had a mortgage or line of credit (averaging 63% without a steady trend 
equivalent to that of I.I.I. calculations of take-up rates of standard hazard 
insurance).75 In other words, while it appears that, given the choice, only 9%–10% 
of U.S. homeowners choose to have flood insurance and only 7%–8% of U.S. 
homeowners choose to have earthquake insurance, 73.5%–87.8% of U.S. 
homeowners choose to have standard hazard insurance. 
Perhaps the most intuitive explanation for this differential in take-up rates 
is that for most American homeowners, flood and earthquake insurance seems an 
over-priced product protecting against an unlikely to occur risk. Or put in the jargon 
of an economist, the differential in take-up rates is the result of self-selecting 
behaviors by homeowners based on either their perceived risk of incurring the peril 
(adverse selection76) or their interest in buying insurance waning quickly as price 
increases (price elasticity77). 
The template to study this intuitive explanation is the NFIP. While adverse 
selection behaviors cannot exist when flood insurance is required (some mortgages 
require a home to have flood insurance), flood insurance remains relatively 
expensive, and voluntary take-up rates are consistent with adverse selection 
behaviors.78 Kunreuther summarizes the problem:  
On the demand side empirical evidence reveals why homeowners 
have been reluctant to protect themselves against low probability-
high consequence events, such as natural disasters, unless they are 
required to do so. On the supply side there are clear reasons why 
the insurance industry has been reluctant to actively promote this 
 
 74. See Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market 
Inefficiencies in the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 VA. J. SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 345, 351 (2011). 
 75. American Housing Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00000&s_year=2011
&s_tablename=TABLE14A&s_bygroup1=19&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=2&s_filtergr
oup2=1 (last visited July 31, 2021) (click “Get Table” to generate table for 2011; to generate 
table for 2013, choose 2013 in “Select Year” dropdown menu and click “Get Table;” repeat 
for 2015 and 2017). 
 76. See, e.g., Paul Hudson et al., Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in Natural 
Disaster Insurance Markets: Empirical Evidence from Germany and the United States, 93 
LAND ECON. 179, 179–80 (2017). 
 77. See, e.g., Ajita Atreya et al., What Drives Households to Buy Flood Insurance? 
New Evidence from Georgia, 117 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 140 (2015). 
 78. See Flood Insurance Coverage of Federal Housing Administration Single-
Family Homes, HUD v–vii, 20–27, 40 (March 30, 2020)  (stating that homes not in a Special 
Flood Hazard Area are less likely to have flood insurance; homes within 600 meters of SFHA 
had insurance take-up rates more similar to homes further away rather than homes within 
SFHA). 
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type of coverage [volume of likely business is low, volume of new 
business is very low, and most acquired business is self-selected 
for risk].79  
In a similar vein, the Federal Insurance Office of the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury (“FIO”) finds: “The location of the NFIP-insured property is among 
the most important underwriting factors affecting the premium charged.”80 The FIO 
further describes: 
Homeowner insurers manage exposures to natural catastrophe 
risks in a variety of ways. One strategy used by insurers is to 
decrease exposure to risk of loss in areas that are subject to natural 
catastrophes. Insurers decrease exposure to the risk of loss by 
imposing moratoria on any new business in certain geographic 
markets or by exiting a market completely. For example, in 2009, 
one insurer ceased writing new business in Florida and in the same 
year non-renewed 11,000 homeowner insurance policies in five 
coastal counties located in Texas. In 2011, another insurer 
announced that it was exiting the Florida market due to the risk of 
natural catastrophes. The ease with which insurers can enter and 
exit a market varies by state. For example, some states require 
notice regarding an insurer’s withdrawal to be given to the state 
insurance regulator 180 days prior to the withdrawal. 
Insurers also respond to increased risk in the homeowner 
insurance market through coverage exclusions and special 
deductibles. For example, most homeowner insurance policies 
exclude losses associated with earthquakes and flooding. In 
addition, although included in homeowner insurance policy 
provisions since the 1990s, concurrent causation clauses have 
been the subject of much debate following both Hurricane Katrina 
and Superstorm Sandy. At times, a covered peril (such as wind) 
may combine with an excluded peril (such as earth movement) to 
cause damage to a home; this is referred to as concurrent 
causation. Unless prohibited by state law, an insurer typically 
includes anti-concurrent causation clauses in homeowner 
insurance policies to limit the insurer’s liability for losses caused 
by excluded perils.81 
 
 79. Howard Kunreuther, Causes of Underinsurance Against Natural Disasters, 9 
GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 206, 219 (1984); see also Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, 
Neglecting Disaster: Why People Don’t Insure Against Large Losses, 28 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2004). But see Celine Grislain-Letrémy, Natural Disasters: Exposure and 
Underinsurance, 129 ANNALS ECON. & STAT. 53, 53 (2018). 
 80. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 31. 
 81. Id. at 18 (footnotes omitted). 
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The bottom line is that for low take-up perils insurance—flood and 
earthquake —the cost is high, and the coverage may be inadequate (for example, the 
NFIP caps available coverage at $250,00082). 
Further, forcing insurers to write coverage for high-risk insureds is no 
solution. The way public insurance can fail as a cost-control or availability 
mechanism is dramatically illustrated by the experience of auto insurance in New 
Jersey in the 1980s, as described by the New Jersey Supreme Court in State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. State.83 For many years, New Jersey “faced an 
intractable problem of providing coverage for high-risk drivers.”84 In 1983, the State 
passed a law requiring all insurers writing auto coverage in the State to write for 
high-risk drivers too in a pool called the Joint Underwriting Association (“JUA”), 
and JUA insurance had to be priced at the same price as for the general population.85 
The idea was that the general population of drivers would partially subsidize high-
risk drivers, with the rest of the cost being covered by the State.86 The result: “by 
1988 over 50% of New Jersey drivers had to be insured by the JUA . . . . [and] the 
JUA . . . accumulated a deficit of over $3.3 billion in unpaid claims and other 
losses.”87 Trying to force insurers to insure just is not good for anyone. 
That said, it of course bears noting that homeowners are not reluctant to 
insure against hazards generally—at least 75% voluntarily do so. In other words, 
behavior in standard hazard insurance belies the explanation of adverse selection 
(or, for that matter, moral hazard).88 
What about price elasticity? The data belie this as well.89 Once a 
homeowner has decided to buy, there is evidence that the homeowner will seek to 
fully insure. Collier and Ragin find that of homeowners who had the option to fully 
insure, under-insure, or over-insure, 79.55% of homeowners are either fully insured 
or over-insured.90 I.I.I. surveys find, “most policyholders do not comparison shop 
for homeowner[s] insurance when it’s time to renew their policy.”91  
In the end, there may be a variety of explanations for the high voluntary 
take-up rates of standard homeowner insurance. Perhaps homeowners who once 
were forced to buy standard hazard insurance continue to do so when the mandate 
is removed. Data from the most recent American Housing Survey of the U.S. Census 
 
 82. National Flood Insurance Program Answers to Questions About the NFIP, 
supra note 54, at 4. 
 83. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. State, 590 A.2d 191 (N.J. 1991). 
 84. Id. at 195. 
 85. Id. at 195–96. 
 86. Id. at 196. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated 
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004). 
 89. Atreya et al., supra note 77. 
 90. See Benjamin L. Collier & Marc A. Ragin, The Influence of Sellers on 
Contract Choice: Evidence from Flood Insurance, WHARTON 12, tbl.3 (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/CollierRagin_Influence-
of-Sellers-on-NFIP-contract-choice.pdf [https://perma.cc/KVH9-AM2X]. 
 91. Homeowners Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, 
supra note 22, at 13. 
2021] ASHES TO ASHES 697 
   
 
Bureau suggest that as of 2017, only 8.5% of owner-occupied homes were purchased 
outright, suggesting 91.5% of homes initially were purchased with some sort of 
mortgage.92 That is a remarkably similar number to total take-up rates of standard 
hazard insurance. One might call this a sort of “Netflix effect”—people pay for the 
service long after they stop watching the shows.93 Or perhaps having purchased 
insurance for many years, homeowners simply see it as a good buy. Misperception 
may be another explanation for the contrasting voluntary take-up rates of standard 
hazard insurance and flood and earthquake insurance. Survey data indicate that 
“43% of homeowners incorrectly believe damage from heavy rain flooding is 
covered under their standard insurance policy,” 28% think hurricane storm surge is 
covered, and 29% think earthquake is covered.94 But consistent with the “Netflix 
effect” explanation is that “many landlords do require their tenants to purchase 
renters insurance,” and while the requirement is “not consistently mandated” and is 
“banned or limited in some states and cities,” the take-up rates of renters insurance 
steadily rose from 29% in 2011 to 57% in 2020.95  
Whatever the explanation, it is patent that roughly two-thirds of U.S. 
homeowners are required to have basic hazard insurance, and three-quarters or more 
of the rest choose to buy it. 
III. HINTS OF A SOLUTION 
The experience of current insurers in the wake of natural disaster gives 
hints of a solution. 
Catastrophes are so-called “fat-tailed” events (the most likely version of 
the event is the least costly, and the least likely is the most costly) involving 
“correlated losses” (when the really bad version happens, it happens to many people 
all at once) making them difficult to insure (meaning hard to price in a way that 
makes the price attractive in a non-event year and yet builds sufficient capital to 
adequately insure in an event year).96 Think of it this way: given the unlikelihood 
 
 92. American Housing Survey (AHS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.
gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00000&s_year=
2017&s_tablename=TABLE13&s_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=1&s_filter
group2=1 (last visited July 31, 2021) (click “Get Table”). 
 93. If there is a Netflix-like indoctrination effect going on, then there are no data 
on what percentage of homeowners would have voluntarily purchased homeowner insurance 
in the absence of this form of indoctrination. The answer perhaps would look like the 
experience of earthquake and flood insurance: 7%–10%. But since over 90% of first-time 
homebuyers do have a mortgage, this is purely hypothetical, counter-narrative speculation. 
 94. Homeowners Insurance: Understanding, Attitudes and Shopping Practices, 
supra note 22, at 2, 6, 9. 
 95. Id. at 4; 2020 Triple-I Consumer Poll, INS. INFO. INST. 11 (Sept. 2020), 
https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/2020_triple-i_consumer_poll_091620.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A9ZX-3RYM]. 
 96. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 6 (citing Tristan Nguyen, 
Insurability of Catastrophe Risks and Government Participation in Insurance Solutions, 
PREVENTIONWEB (2013), http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2013/en/bgdocs/
Nguyen,%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/YJP7-JP3A]; Carolyn Kousky, Managing the Risk of 
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that a storm of sufficient magnitude ever will destroy any particular Jacksonville, 
Florida, semi-inland home, a Jacksonville homeowner who doesn’t live quite close 
to the water might only voluntarily buy flood insurance if it was cheap. But given 
that the insurer knows that in the unlikely event such a storm occurs that it could 
destroy hundreds of semi-inland Jacksonville homes all at once, the insurance 
cannot profitably be priced cheaply.97 
The challenge is illustrated by the 2011 work of Kunreuther, Michel-
Kerjan, and Ranger, who explored “the potential implications of climate change for 
the availability and affordability of insurance in the world’s largest insurance 
market, the USA, focusing on wind-related property insurance in Florida.”98 They 
found: 
[T]he total price of insurance for Florida (assuming constant 
exposure) could increase significantly by 2040, from $12.9 billion 
(in 1990) to $14.2 billion, under hard market conditions. Under 
the lower bound projection, premiums could decline to $9.4 
billion by 2040. Taking a broader range of climate change 
scenarios, prices could be between $4.7 and $32.1 billion by 2040. 
The upper end of this range could suggest that insurance becomes 
unaffordable for many people in Florida. Adaptation significantly 
reduces losses and premiums under all scenarios and extends the 
amount of coverage that could be provided by the private 
insurance market. The implementation of loss reduction measures 
and provision of reinsurance against catastrophic losses can 
increase the availability of insurance in Florida and make it more 
affordable to residents of the state even under a high loss climate 
change scenario.99 
Price also can be driven down by diverse, populated, and undistorted risk pools. In 
some communities, for example, an effective response to the high cost of flood 
insurance has been to have community rating models (requiring insurance providers 
to offer insurance policies within a given territory at the same price without regard 
to otherwise differentiating underwriting factors) trigger more aggressive risk-
spreading; this model results in price reductions greater than 40%.100 
 
Natural Catastrophes: The Role and Functioning of State Insurance Programs, RES. FOR 
FUTURE 2 (Sept. 22, 2010), https://www.rff.org/publications/working-papers/managing-the-
risk-of-natural-catastrophes-the-role-and-functioning-of-state-insurance-programs/ [https://
perma.cc/HMZ2-KXLH]). 
 97. See generally French, supra note 6, at 831–32 (and sources cited therein). 
 98. Howard Kunreuther et al., Insuring Climate Catastrophes in Florida: An 
Analysis of Insurance Pricing and Capacity under Various Scenarios of Climate Change and 




 99. Id. at 14–15. 
 100. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 33. 
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But in a competitive market without the requirement of community pricing, 
homeowners will be driven into public or quasi-public products of last resort. Even 
in populous California, policies such as the California Fair Access to Insurance 
Requirements (“FAIR”) Plan101 increasingly are the only available fire insurance for 
homeowners in high-risk areas.102 
What does this mean? The CDI estimates 3.6 million California homes are 
in the wildland-urban interface.103 Zillow estimates that nearly half a million homes 
in California are at high or very high fire risk.104 CoreLogic notes 400,000 homes at 
extreme fire risk just in the metropolitan areas of Los Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, 
Sacramento, and San Francisco.105 I.I.I. and Verisk Analytics put that number at 
greater than two million homes statewide.106 By any measure that’s a lot of homes, 
and homeowners are finding that, in the markets as currently structured, private 
homeowner insurance is or soon will be unavailable or unaffordable. 
Kunreuther argues that private insurers should have an interest in 
promoting an all-hazards policy.107 Kunreuther argues that all-hazards coverage (or 
what is referred to in this Article as All Perils) avoids post-event litigation over 
whether the cause of loss is covered or excluded, and all-hazards coverage results in 
risk “diversified across hazards and thus reduces the variance of losses via the law 
of large numbers.”108 It is unclear whether, in the insurance markets as currently 
structured, private insurers lack enthusiasm for selling all-hazards policies, 
homeowners lack enthusiasm for buying all-hazards policies, or both. What is clear 
is that all-hazards insurance is not prevalent in the market.109 Consequently, 
government has had to step into the breach with FAIR Plans, the NFIP, and the 
 
 101. Insurance of last resort for homeowners who cannot find fire insurance for 
their dwelling. See About FAIR Plan, CAL. FAIR PLAN PROP. INS., https://www.
cfpnet.com/about-fair-plan/ [https://perma.cc/WHT3-M5Q2] (last visited July 31, 2021). 
 102. Fact Sheet: Impact of Wildfires on Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability, 
supra note 31. 
 103. The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential 
Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of 
California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 1. 
 104. Sydney Price, Nearly 500,000 California Homes at High or Very High Fire 
Risk, BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-
26/nearly-500-000-california-homes-at-high-or-very-high-fire-risk. 
 105. 2019 CoreLogic Wildfire Risk Report Highlights U.S. Wildfire Vulnerability, 
Finding Nearly 776,000 Homes at Extreme Risk of Wildfire Damage this Year, CORELOGIC 
(Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.corelogic.com/news/2019-corelogic-wildfire-risk-report-
highlights-us-wildfire-vulnerability-finding-nearly-776000-homes-at-extreme-risk-of-
wildfire.aspx [https://perma.cc/W8KB-DWU5]. 
 106. More Than 2 Million California Homes Exposed to High Wildfire Danger, 
AER (2012), https://www.aer.com/news-events/press-releases/2012/more-2-million-
california-homes-exposed-high-wildfire-danger/ [https://perma.cc/NK8T-F9GR]. 
 107. Kunreuther, supra note 37 (citing HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., 
INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS: IMPROVING DECISIONS IN THE MOST 
MISUNDERSTOOD INDUSTRY 20–23 (2013)). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for 
Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 3–4, 15–48. 
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like.110 These products become exemplars of the challenges of insuring fat-tailed, 
correlated-loss risks. The products have high prices and low take-up rates,111 and 
therefore fail to realize the price efficiencies (risk-spreading) only available if 
insurance is ubiquitous among a broad, undistorted risk pool. “[E]ither because of 
political pressure [public, last resort insurance products] are actuarially unsound and 
end up creating a continuing liability to governments, or in failing to price individual 
risks correctly they encourage property development in risky locations . . . .”112 
The clearest route to an affordable price is community rating of “all perils” 
insurance. “By bundling hazards in a single policy, property owners are likely to 
perceive the risk to be sufficiently high that they will want to purchase coverage 
prior to experiencing a disaster.”113 Conversely, non-renewal frequency in the wake 
of mass loss events indicates the mechanics and incentives of geographic and risk 
segmentation.114 This all suggests that a solution would be public All Perils 
insurance, if it were both politically and actuarially possible (it apparently is not),115 
or otherwise restructuring private markets to promote something akin to community 
pricing in health insurance.116 
But this solution only works if an insurer can sell it, which an insurer cannot 
do so long as the insurer will be price-cut by its competitors. 
IV. EXTANT PROPOSALS TO MAKE HOMEOWNER INSURANCE FOR 
NATURAL CATASTROPHES AFFORDABLE AND AVAILABLE 
A. California’s Proposal for Legislative Reform of Homeowner Insurers and 
Ratemaking 
In 2018, the CDI published The Availability and Affordability of Coverage 
for Wildfire Loss in Residential Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. See, e.g., Andrew Blankstein & Monica Alba, Why Do So Few California 
Homeowners Have Earthquake Insurance?, NBC (Oct. 17, 2014, 6:28 AM), https://www.nbc
news.com/news/investigations/why-do-so-few-california-homeowners-have-earthquake-
insurance-n227711#:~:text=Premiums%20for%20earthquake%20insurance%20range,the%
20counties%20most%20at%20risk [https://perma.cc/39ZR-M9WK]; Mark Andrew Boyer, 
Is Earthquake Insurance Worth the Cost?, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS (June 14, 2010), https://
uphelp.org/is-earthquake-insurance-worth-the-cost/ [https://perma.cc/CUP2-AFZ8]; Les 
Christie, 3 Reasons Why Californians Shun Quake Insurance, CNN (Aug. 27, 2014, 12:35 
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2014/08/25/pf/insurance/earthquake-insurance-cost/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/5DZJ-P3W4]. 
 112. John McAneney et al., Government-Sponsored Natural Disaster Insurance 
Pools: A View from Down-Under, 15 INT’L. J. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION 1, 7 (2016); see 
also Justin R. Pidot, Coastal Disaster Insurance in the Era of Global Warming: The Case for 
Relying on the Private Market, SSRN 1 (Apr. 28. 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1695697. 
 113. Kunreuther, supra note 37. 
 114. Fact Sheet: Impact of Wildfires on Insurance Non-Renewals and Availability, 
supra note 31.  
 115. See generally John McAneney et al., supra note 112, at 4–5. 
 116. See generally French, supra note 6, at 833 (citing Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548 (2012)). 
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and Other High-Risk Areas of California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions.117 
The proposal outlined “legislative concepts” the CDI believed were “necessary” to 
address the issues of affordability and availability.118 
To address availability, the CDI proposed that any insurer wishing to offer 
homeowner insurance anywhere in California must either also offer it in high fire-
risk areas to homes that meet specified mitigation protocols or offer supplemental 
insurance to the California FAIR Plan to add the coverages the FAIR Plan lacks: 
An insurer admitted to transact fire insurance would agree to offer, 
issue, or renew a “policy of residential property insurance” for 
reasons relating to the risk of fire loss on property located within 
“state responsibility areas,” . . . if the property meets specific 
mitigation and defensible-space criteria and any other underwriting 
guidelines relating to the peril of fire that have a substantial 
relationship to the risk of fire loss, which guidelines would be 
approved by the Insurance Commissioner . . . . An insurer admitted 
to transact fire insurance may refuse to offer, issue, or renew a “policy 
of residential property insurance” for reasons relating to the risk of 
fire loss on property located within “state responsibility areas,” . . . if 
the insurer instead offers the applicant or insured a “difference in 
conditions” insurance policy and/or a “premises liability” insurance 
policy . . . . A “premises liability” policy is one that covers bodily 
injury and property damage suffered by others in connection with the 
property, including personal liability coverage and medical-payment 
coverage. The premises-liability policy offered by the insurer must be 
at least as broad as the liability portion of coverage offered by that 
insurer under its homeowners’ insurance coverage.119 
In order to reduce the frequency of an insurer declining to renew coverage 
or dramatically increasing premiums in order to renew, the CDI proposed a process 
for homeowners to appeal and get the CDI involved in an insurer’s underwriting 
decisions.120 
Finally, to address affordability, the CDI proposed three reforms. First, the 
CDI proposed premium subsidies from the State: “A property insured under a policy 
of residential property insurance is eligible for a premium credit, as compared to 
other similarly situated properties, if the property meets specific mitigation and 
defensible-space criteria, as described above, for offering, issuing, and renewing 
homeowners’ insurance coverage.”121 
Second, the CDI proposed disallowing most disaster modeling in rate 
filings: 
 
 117. The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in Residential 
Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas of 
California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17. 
 118. Id. at 6. 
 119. Id. at 7. 
 120. Id. at 10–11. 
 121. Id. at 8. 
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Insurers will be permitted to use a “wildfire-risk model” (to determine 
eligibility for, or the premium of, a policy of residential property 
insurance) only if it has been filed with and approved by the Insurance 
Commissioner. Under this proposal, a “wildfire-risk model” is 
defined as any computer-based, map-based, or other measurement or 
simulation tool used by an insurer to rate, underwrite, or otherwise 
assess or evaluate the risk of wildfire and/or consequence of wildfire 
to residential structures. The Insurance Commissioner shall not 
approve a wildfire-risk model used by an insurer to determine 
eligibility for, or the premium of, a policy of residential property 
insurance unless the model takes into account the amount and density 
of fuel surrounding the structure, slope and slope aspect (direction) 
of the property, accessibility to the property by emergency 
responders, and any community-level or property-level mitigation 
efforts, if that data is provided by state or local fire officials or is 
otherwise available to the insurer by way of an inspection of the 
property.122 
Third, the CDI proposed aggregating data to have more accurate risk 
ratemaking: 
CDI will be granted authority to obtain data from insurers in order to 
examine the aggregated California premium-and-loss data by wildfire 
risk (e.g., the data used by CALFIRE’s model) to create a wildfire-
exposure-risk manual similar in concept to the frequency and severity 
bands manual used by auto insurers in developing private passenger 
auto rates. Insurers could rely on the aggregated wildfire-exposure-
risk data to develop credible wildfire-risk rates that would allow them 
to more accurately price the few risks currently being written as well 
as loosen their current underwriting restrictions and write more risks 
that are currently being turned down for coverage.123 
In February of 2020, the CDI proposed and argued for legislation to 
increase the prevalence of “fire-hardened” communities.124 The bill faced fierce 
industry opposition and died in committee.125  That same year, the California 
Insurance Commissioner vowed to pursue the same initiative by regulation.126 In 
February of 2021, the Commissioner and the Governor of California announced an 
initiative to do so.127 
 
 122. Id. at 10. 
 123. Id. at 12. 
 124. Act of Feb. 18, 2020, No. 2367, 2019–2020 Cal. Legisl. 
http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB2367 
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Section 13575) to Chapter 2, Division 3 of the Insurance Code). 
 125. Id.; Bikales, supra note 37. 
 126. See Bikales, supra note 37.  
 127. Commissioner Lara and Governor Newsom’s Administration to Establish 
Home and Community Hardening Standards for Insurance, CAL. DEP’T INS. (Feb. 8, 2021) 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2021/releaseXXX-2021.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/XKZ2-J8GH]. 
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B. Professor Kunreuther’s Proposal for Private, All-Perils Homeowner Insurance 
In 2018, Professor Howard Kunreuther—arguably the most important and 
prolific academic writer on insurance and natural disaster—proposed solving 
affordability and availability through a regulatory restructuring by states to require 
the sale of All Perils insurance, or, put another way, to prohibit homeowner hazard 
insurance that excluded perils such as flood and earthquake.128 
Kunreuther starts from two premises: “Premiums should reflect risk” and 
“any special treatment given to low-income individuals currently residing in hazard-
prone areas should come from general public funding and not through insurance 
premium subsidies.”129 
Kunreuther then proposes a multi-pronged solution. Kunreuther proposes 
that “policymakers should consider requiring catastrophic coverage for all 
individuals who face risk.”130 He proposes “risk-based insurance premiums 
. . . coupled with building codes so that those residing in hazard-prone areas adopt 
cost-effective loss-reduction measures.”131 He contemplates “property improvement 
loans” and multi-year insurance contracts “of 3–5 years with backup from the public 
sector on catastrophic losses.”132 He envisions “means-tested vouchers or tax-credits 
via the public sector to those who undertook cost-effective mitigation measures.”133 
Finally, he argues for state reinsurance facilities to the extent that the private sector 
does not fulfill this role.134 
Kunreuther asserts: “If insurers were permitted to charge risk-based 
premiums, they would very likely want to market coverage against earthquakes and 
floods as long as they were protected against catastrophic losses.”135 And he argues 
that “by bundling hazards into a single policy, property owners are likely to perceive 
the risk to be sufficiently high that they will want to purchase coverage prior to 
experiencing a disaster.”136 
C. Professor French’s Proposal for Public, All-Perils Homeowner Insurance 
Professor Christopher French’s work is more of a departure from current 
market structures than that of the CDI or Kunreuther. French describes how 
earthquakes and floods are correlated risks, and so have long been excluded from 
traditional hazard insurance of flood and earthquake as too dangerous to insurer 
solvency.137 French also describes how wildfire, as distinct from “regular” fire, 
behaves as a correlated risk too expensive to insure.138 French explains how the 
 
 128. Kunreuther, supra note 37; accord Mary Kelly et al., supra note 71, at 26. 
 129. Kunreuther, supra note 37. 
 130. Id. at 149. 
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 133. Id. at 152. 
 134. See id. at 149, 152. 
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 137. See French, supra note 6, at 824–25. 
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solution is All Perils insurance sold in large, undistorted risk pools.139 French further 
explains why he and other scholars believe insurance should be thought of “as 
something more akin to a public financial instrument than a traditional contract 
between private parties,” and thus “[p]rivate insurers should not be allowed to refuse 
to insure existing high-risk properties in the absence of an alternative insurance 
option.”140 But recognizing that private insurers will never be forced to affordably 
insure high-risk properties,141 French proposes an alternative insurance option.142 
That proposal is: “bundling coverages for numerous types of natural catastrophe 
perils together in a single policy sold by the [federal] government . . . .”143 
Simply put, French recognizes the fundamental failing of public insurance 
of last resort—it is the “last resort” aspect. Last resort insurance is insurance of high-
risk insureds, and in order to be actuarially sound, it must price as a high-risk pool. 
Politicians are given a Hobson’s Choice: either offer actuarially unsound insurance 
or price their own constituents out of the market. 
French solves this problem by eliminating any avenue for low-risk insureds 
to get private standard hazard insurance, and so he eliminates the “last resort” 
structure, thus driving down the price. While he is not explicit about whether he is 
proposing nationalized insurance or a public option, he must be proposing the former 
because currently public All Perils insurance as an option could not compete with 
private insurance as currently sold. In all but high-risk areas where private insurers 
refuse to offer coverage, private insurers would parse out risk and offer cheaper 
insurance for covered perils. So, one has to understand French’s proposal as 
envisioning that private insurers will be out of the homeowner insurance business. 
V. CONCERNS WITH THE EXTANT PROPOSALS 
A. CDI’s Approach 
The CDI’s proposal is provocative in its philosophical structure—it 
essentially imposes the rule that an insurer who wants to offer insurance anywhere 
in California has to offer it everywhere (assuming the home or community has taken 
appropriate mitigation measures). Under the proposal, an insurer who wishes to sell 
insurance anywhere has to commit to sell it in all high-risk communities.144 So, 
unless an insurer wishes to write only high-risk insurance, the insurer presumably 
will try to capture as much non-high-risk business as possible. The idea is innovative 
and sound. California is the most populous state in the United States. The industry 
as a whole is not going to abandon the states entirely. 
But the CDI’s solution to availability is a bit illusory as a means of 
promoting private hazard insurance for the rebuilding of a dwelling post-fire, 
because a private insurer wishing to do business in California is not required to write 
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 141. See id. at 847. 
 142. See id. at 847–58. 
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 144. See The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in 
Residential Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas 
of California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 7. 
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dwelling coverage in a high-risk community. Rather, an insurer is required either to 
offer dwelling coverage or write supplemental coverage to public FAIR Plan 
dwelling coverage.145 This will solve availability but will do nothing for 
affordability. Because an insurer will not have to compete on price and there will 
not be a requirement of undistorted risk pools (risk-spreading), the insurers do not 
have an incentive to reduce price. 
The CDI’s approach to affordability rests on an assumption that, with 
proper mitigation, even homes in otherwise high-risk places will be affordably 
insurable.146 Thus, except for some low-income homeowners (who will receive 
premium subsidies), property with appropriate mitigation measures will, if properly 
underwritten, have an affordable premium. 
All observable evidence suggests that mitigation alone does not resolve 
unaffordability. First, if there are mitigation measures at a community level that 
substantially change risk profiles and thus drive down insurance costs, then one 
would expect communities already do them. For some communities, of course, this 
sort of comprehensive mitigation is either unaffordable or not cost-justified. But if 
that is the case for all communities, then mitigation as a cost-control measure is 
either not feasible or not reasonable. Or, put another way, if by aggressively 
mitigating risk a community could change its risk profile from high-risk to low-risk 
and thus make insurance broadly available and affordable in that community without 
unacceptable consequences to the environment and other concerns, then of course a 
community would do that.147 Communities ubiquitously would have done so. There 
either wouldn’t be high-insurance cost communities at all or there wouldn’t be 
enough such communities to be characterized as a state-wide crisis. A statewide 
unaffordability crisis would not exist. Legislative reform would not be necessary.  
This is not to say that state-encouraged or even state-required community- 
or home-specific mitigation is a bad idea. Community and individual home 
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risk. . . . CDI believes there are legislative changes that can be enacted to lessen the severity 
of these high-premium increases. . . . A property insured under a policy of residential property 
insurance is eligible for a premium credit, as compared to other similarly situated properties, 
if the property meets specific mitigation and defensible-space criteria, as described above, for 
offering, issuing, and renewing homeowners’ insurance coverage.”). 
 147. See Howard Kunreuther et al., Risk Analysis for Extreme Events: Economic 
Incentives for Reducing Future Losses, NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH. 49–66 (Oct. 2004), 
https://tsapps.nist.gov/publication/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=100961 [https://perma.cc/Y7X5-
7WFR] (discussing when it is cost effective for homeowners or communities to adopt 
voluntary mitigation measures, accounting for all factors including the wealth of the 
homeowner and the savings in insurance premiums); accord Andrew S. Natsios, Economic 
Incentives and Disaster Mitigation, CIDBIMENA, http://cidbimena.desastres.hn/pdf/eng/
doc4729/doc4729-contenido.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN2H-YQMT] (last visited Aug 2, 2021) 
(“Policymakers can probably change social behaviors more effectively through market 
incentives than by threatening punishment for failure to comply with rules.”). It is, of course, 
possible to require a community to cut down all the trees and shrubs within a mile of the 
community, pave over every surface, and build all structures out of concrete. But that is not 
going to happen. 
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mitigation can and does help.148 But it is not a magic bullet to resolve affordability 
in high-risk areas.149 Homeowners in high-risk communities will still pay for 
insurance priced on the basis that they live in high-risk communities. And that 
insurance will be priced as a high-risk pool of insureds.150 
And homeowners cannot (or will not) solve that problem by mitigating at 
a homeowner level. Nothing prevents homeowners right now from voluntarily fire-
hardening their home to realize a lower price of insurance. Only 24% of 
homeowners say they are likely to take action to protect their homes if it would 
lower the premiums on their insurance.151 This suggests that homeowners do not 
perceive the cost of mitigation to be worth the savings in insurance premiums. 
Unless a state intervenes, there is absolutely nothing that prevents an insurer right 
now from requiring mitigation as a condition of insurance. Again, if the cost of 
mitigation was perceived by homeowners as affordable, and if that in turn was a 
sufficient basis to drive price from current levels to affordable levels, then insurers 
already would require mitigation as a means of capturing business. 
This is not simply a consumer-education issue. Insurers and regulators 
think deeply about how to better educate consumers about mitigation and promoting 
 
 148. See, e.g., Mitigation Matters – and Hurricane Sally Proved It, INS. INFO. INST.: 




perma.cc/4XXG-THQS]; Dale Kasler & Phillip Reese, ‘The Weakest Link’: Why Your House 
May Burn While Your Neighbor’s Survives the Next Wildfire, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 11, 
2019), https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article227665284.html; Joseph Serna, 
Want to Fireproof Your Home? It Takes a Village, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/environment/story/2019-10-03/wildfire-defense-fire-proof-home-
hardening-sprinklers [https://perma.cc/2FGA-HY6U]. 
 149. See, e.g., Bikales, supra note 37 (reporting on homeowners who did everything 
the insurance company asked of them and still were not renewed). For another, more dramatic 
example, see the Grand Jury Report in 2008—ten years before the Camp Fire—on how to 
protect the community of Paradise California from wildfire. Butte County Grand Jury Report 
2008/2009 Wildfire & Safety Considerations for Butte County General Plan 2030, BUTTE 
CNTY., https://www.buttecounty.net/Portals/1/GrandJury/08-09/Grand_Jury_Report_FY08-
09-Sec10.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8JY-3A2S] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021). It will not be lost on 
insurers that the Camp Fire still occurred, even with this introspective mitigation plan, and so 
undoubtedly if and when Paradise is rebuilt insurance will either be unavailable or 
unaffordable for many. 
 150. See, e.g., David Lazarus, California Fires Will Result in Higher Insurance 
Rates for Homeowners, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019) https://www.latimes.com/business/
story/2019-10-31/fire-insurance-david-lazarus-column [https://perma.cc/F9T9-9HBA] 
(quoting Mark Sektnan, vice president of the American Property Casualty Association, as 
saying, “Insurers will continue to reflect risk in their rates. As risk increases, so will rates.”). 
See generally Christopher J. Conover & Emily P. Zeitler, High Risk Pools (Duke Univ. Health 
Ins. Regul., Working Paper No. 1-10, 2006), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.1090.5411&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
 151. 2020 Triple-I Consumer Poll, supra note 95, at 6. 
2021] ASHES TO ASHES 707 
   
 
perils insurance.152 Insurers want to sell lots of insurance. And governments want 
lots of safe homes. And so far, none of these efforts have worked. 
One might argue that consumers in the hundreds of millions remain wrong 
(or ignorant) about the relative costs and benefits of mitigation. Economists argue 
that people misvalue high-consequence, low-likelihood risks.153 But if consumer 
misperception is the root cause of low voluntary take-up of earthquake and flood 
insurance, then correcting misperception plainly is a stickier issue than better 
education and information can solve.154 For whatever reason, the market behaves as 
if the cost of mitigation does not justify the savings or even the availability of 
insurance.155 
In sum, if homeowner-level mitigation was the solution to affordability in 
high-risk areas and the cost of mitigation did not create unaffordability issues of its 
own, then there wouldn’t be ubiquitously unaffordable insurance in high-risk areas. 
And requiring mitigation isn’t going to solve the issue of unaffordable insurance in 
high-risk areas. 
Finally, the CDI proposal requiring supplemental coverage to the FAIR 
Plan bears brief discussion. The FAIR Plan has coverage gaps. This CDI proposal 
will address those coverage gaps. But it will not make the total premium a 
 
 152. See, e.g., Do I Need Flood Insurance for my Home?, INS. INFO. INST.  
https://www.iii.org/article/do-i-need-flood-insurance-for-my-home [https://perma.cc/J3AY-
DRNK] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); Do I Need Flood Insurance?, ALLSTATE (June 2019) 
https://www.allstate.com/tr/flood-insurance/do-i-need-flood-insurance.aspx; Flood 
Insurance: Why You Need a Policy and What It Costs, TEX. DEP’T INS. (May 25, 2021),  
https://www.tdi.texas.gov/tips/flood-insurance-cost.html [https://perma.cc/Q3LW-5LQY]; 
Protect Your Home with Flood Insurance, GEICO,  https://www.geico.com/flood-insurance/ 
[https://perma.cc/RM7M-LMRP] (last visited Aug. 2, 2021); ‘What the Flood!’ NAIC Quiz 
Helps Americans Understand Flood Insurance, NAIC, https://naic-
static.org/Releases/2019_docs/what_the_flood_quiz.htm [https://perma.cc/M6S2-UF2P] 
(last visited Aug. 2, 2021); The Truth About Earthquake Insurance, LEMONADE, 
https://www.lemonade.com/blog/earthquake-insurance/ [https://perma.cc/L8CC-ZV6L] (last 
visited Aug. 3, 2021); Fault Lines: Do I Need Earthquake Insurance?, USAA (Dec. 8, 2020), 
https://www.usaa.com/inet/wc/advice-disaster-knowyourquake?akredirect=true; Do You 
Need Earthquake Insurance if You Don’t Live on the Coast?, STATE FARM 
https://www.statefarm.com/simple-insights/residence/do-you-need-earthquake-insurance 
[https://perma.cc/33AF-7SZF] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021); Earthquake Insurance, CAL. 
DEP’T INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/105-type/95-guides/03-res/eq-
ins.cfm [https://perma.cc/FFM7-YDZD] (last visited Aug. 4, 2021). 
 153. See, e.g., Paul Slovic et al., Preferences for Insuring Against Probable Small 
Losses: Insurance Implications, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 51, 67–68 (Paul Slovic ed., 
2000); HOWARD KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS 
236–37 (1978). 
 154. See generally J. C. J. H. Aerts et al., Integrating Human Behaviour Dynamics 
into Flood Disaster Risk Assessment, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 193 (2018) (describing 
how the willingness to invest in risk avoidance or reduction measures such as mitigation and 
insurance fades over time due to human cognitive factors influencing risk perception, even 
though from a purely economic calculus the rationality of the choice has not changed.) 
 155. At the risk of belaboring the point, if the cost of mitigation was justified by the 
savings realized from available, affordable, insurance, then one would expect to see this 
playing out in communities on the ground. 
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homeowner pays for “FAIR Plan + private-insurer supplemental coverage” any 
cheaper than already unaffordable, private insurance. 
B. Kunreuther’s Approach 
An important and novel insight of Kunreuther’s approach is his explication 
of how manipulation of market incentives can change the availability and 
affordability of private All Perils insurance in high-risk communities. The crux of 
Kunreuther’s proposal is demand-side focused, requiring homeowners in high-risk 
areas to buy coverage for all perils. Kunreuther does not explain the mechanics of 
how such a requirement would be structured or enforced. But assuming there is such 
an architecture, Kunreuther does not describe his idea as a mechanism to reduce 
price but rather as a mechanism to have public support of price through vouchers.156 
One might think of Kunreuther’s approach as analogous to the Affordable 
Care Act, with the mandate and required coverages, but without community pricing. 
Such an approach to insurance is significantly more proactive in addressing the 
prevalence of insureds seeking to buy insurance than it is in addressing the cost of 
that insurance.157 Put another way, it does a really good job of making sure almost 
everyone is insured and does very little to control the cost of the insurance. 
For that reason, Kunreuther’s approach may be small solace to the 
communities currently suffering a crisis of homeowner insurance availability and 
affordability. In those communities, homeowners will be required to buy insurance, 
but insurers will not be required to sell it at all, much less at an affordable price. Put 
another way, insurers will have no incentive to make that insurance cheaper than it 
is today. Rather, Kunreuther’s proposal simply anticipates shifting some 
responsibility for paying all or some of the bill from the pocketbook of insureds to 
the pocketbook of governments and does so without positioning governments to 
bargain on price. It bears noting that there is nothing today that prevents 
governments from offering aggressive vouchers to support all perils insurance in 
high-risk communities. If governments saw offering aggressive vouchers as a viable 
solution, then presumably it already would be happening. 
C. French’s Approach 
French’s proposal is audacious and comprehensive, and it would work. But 
is it politically possible? 
French proposes national, public All Perils insurance. French does an 
effective job of knocking back many anticipated criticisms to his proposal. In 
response to concern about imposing cross-subsidization amongst insureds, he notes 
that this argument proves too much because all insurance involves cross-
subsidization to one degree or another.158 In response to anticipated political blow-
 
 156. Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 147–51. 
 157. See Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin & John A. Graves, How the ACA Dented the 
Cost Curve: An Analysis of Whether or Not the Affordable Care Act Reduced the Annual Rate 
at Which Total National Health Care Costs Increased and Brought Per Capita Health 
Spending Growth Rates Down, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 403 (2020) (describing how the ACA’s 
direct and indirect impacts on the cost of health insurance and the delivery of health care 
remains uneven and uncertain ten years after passage of the Act). 
 158. See French, supra note 6, at 858–59. 
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back based on accusations of socialism, he highlights examples of popular, extant 
government programs that are philosophically socialist.159 He recognizes the 
perception of some that “America needs less governmental involvement with private 
industries, not more,” and he responds that insurance is already highly regulated.160 
He deals with the inevitable criticism that insuring natural disasters creates moral 
hazard by detailing how these concerns, when pressed back upon and tested, do not 
bear out.161 And he squares up to the weary history of public insurance programs—
most notably the NFIP162—as at best poor substitutes for private insurance.163 
Specifically, he makes the case that bundling all perils into a single, national policy 
would resolve the inefficiencies of public insurance written to cover idiosyncratic 
regional risks.164 
But what French does not address are the political realities of whether his 
proposal could ever actually come to pass. And while generically it might be a 
foolish endeavor to try to predict the chances of passing any particular legislative 
initiative, there is a lot of clarity on how both the industry and insurance 
regulators/legislators would react to French’s proposal. 
It is not hard to predict the industry’s reaction. French’s proposal is an 
existential threat to an entire profitable industry segment. The NAIC reports that in 
2019, for example, Homeowners Multiple Peril Insurance generated over $90 billion 
in net premium earned, generating 1.4% in underwriting profits, 3% investment gain 
on insurance transactions, and 6.6% gain in net worth.165 To protect these amounts 
of profit, the industry reaction will be the same as its reaction to health insurance 
proposals to nationalize health care through “Medicare For All”—do whatever it 
takes to defeat the proposal.166 
 
 159. Id. at 859–60. 
 160. Id. at 861. 
 161. Id. at 861–65. 
 162. See generally The Cost of Climate, FIRST ST. FOUND. (Feb. 2021), 
https://assets.firststreet.org/uploads/2021/02/The_Cost_of_Climate_FSF20210219-1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8M28-TS7G]. 
 163. French, supra note 6, at 865–69 (2020). But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. 
Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571 (2016). 
 164. Id. 
 165. Report on Profitability by Line and by State in 2019, NAIC 37 (2020), 
https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/publication-pbl-pb-profitability-line-state.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NYQ3-ZAF5]. 
 166. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Health Care and Insurance Industry Mobilize to Kill 
‘Medicare for All’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/23/us/
politics/medicare-for-all-lobbyists.html; Jeff Stein, ‘We’ve Done a Lot More than You Would 
Think’: How the Health-Insurance Industry is Working to Pull Democrats away from 
Medicare-for-all, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
2019/04/12/weve-done-lot-more-than-you-would-think-how-health-insurance-industry-is-
working-pull-democrats-away-medicare-for-all/; P’SHIP FOR AM.’S HEALTH CARE FUTURE, 
https://americashealthcarefuture.org/ [https://perma.cc/U6LN-8XG6] (last visited Aug. 4, 
2021) (“Build on what’s working . . . not start over”); A Brief History: Universal Health Care 
Efforts in the U.S., PNHP, https://pnhp.org/a-brief-history-universal-health-care-efforts-in-
the-us/ [https://perma.cc/JX3V-MMPM] (last visited Aug. 4, 2021). 
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Regulator response will be no better. The NAIC “is governed by the chief 
insurance regulators from the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and five U.S. 
territories” and is committed to “state-based insurance.”167 How committed? The 
NAIC has created and runs the website, <statebasedsystems.com>.168 Similarly, the 
press release of the NAIC marking the organization’s 150th anniversary was sub-
headed Historical Milestone and Highlights Value of State-based Regulatory 
System.169 There is little reason to expect regulators are going to support nationalized 
homeowner insurance. 
And then there will be the response of state legislators. The National 
Council of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) “works to both preserve the state 
jurisdiction over insurance as established by the McCarran-Ferguson Act seventy-
four years ago,” and “toward that end, NCIOL works to . . . [a]ssert the prerogative 
of legislators in making state policy when it comes to insurance” including 
“speak[ing] out on Congressional initiatives that attempt to encroach upon state 
primacy in overseeing insurance . . . ;” as NCOIL emphasizes, “NCOIL is an 
adamant, vocal opponent of any Congressional initiative that would deprive 
consumers of key state protections, preempt state laws that respond to unique 
insurance markets, [and] threaten critical state premium tax revenue . . . .”170 One 
can confidently predict NCOIL opposition. 
But what about public support? For some insight, consider the experience 
of a “public option” in health insurance—a significant step down from Medicare-
For-All. As of this writing, for the first eleven years of the political life of health 
care reform resulting in the Affordable Care Act in all of its iterations, a public 
option has never even reached a floor vote in Congress.171 And that is despite about 
 
 167. About, NAIC, https://content.naic.org/index_about.htm [https://perma.cc/
XXX4-YH9G] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021). 
 168. About Us, NAIC, https://statebasedsystems.com/solar/about.html [https://
perma.cc/KMM8-9S9N] (last visited Aug. 6, 2020). 
 169. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) to Celebrate 
150th Anniversary, NAIC (Jan. 14, 2021), https://content.naic.org/article/news_release_
national_association_insurance_commissioners_naic_celebrate_150th_anniversary.htm 
[https://perma.cc/U72K-ZV6D]. 
 170. History & Purpose, NAT’L COUNCIL INS. LEGISLATORS, 
http://ncoil.org/history-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/WS6V-YHKG] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021). 
 171. See generally Helen A. Halpin & Peter Harbage, The Origins and Demise of 
the Public Option, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1117 (2010). 
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70% public support.172 Medicare-For-All has only about 40% public support.173 The 
public perception of a crisis in natural disaster insurance is far less than any public 
understanding of a health care insurance crisis. It appears that less than half of the 
nation thinks they have a risk of a natural disaster risk at all, and it may be that far 
more Americans think they are insured for a disaster such as flood than actually 
are.174 There is no groundswell or even sprouting seeds for a public clamoring for 
nationalized homeowner hazard insurance. 
Functionally, nationalized homeowner hazard insurance has no friends; it 
is a political orphan. There are many reasons to worry that French’s proposal—
intelligent and necessary and correct as it is (it would work!)—nonetheless is not 
going to happen. 
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
Because so much groundwork has been done by the exceptional work of 
others, it now is simpler to describe a solution to the sticky problem of insuring 
disaster—a solution that threads the needle between the CDI’s approach, 
Kunreuther’s approach, and French’s approach, navigating around the shoals of 
trouble each of those approaches may founder upon. 
 
 172. Poll: Democrats Like Both the Public Option and Medicare-for-All, but 
Overall More People Support the Public Option, Including a Significant Share of 
Republicans, KFF (Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/press-release/poll-
democrats-like-public-option-medicare-for-all-but-overall-more-people-support-public-
option-including-significant-share-of-republicans/ [https://perma.cc/AJB3-MLX6]; Nate 
Silver, Medicare For All Isn’t That Popular – Even Among Democrats, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT 
(July 25, 2019, 1:29 PM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/medicare-for-all-isnt-that-
popular-even-among-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/D877-DYPL] (describing MARIST POLL 
15, http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/NPR_PBS-NewsHour_Marist-
Poll_USA-NOS-and-Tables_1907190926.pdf#page=3 [https://perma.cc/L7GC-2632] (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2021)). 
 173. Silver, supra note 172. 
 174. See 2020 Triple-I Consumer Poll, supra note 95, at 5–10 (“Among 
homeowners, 17 percent say they live in an area likely to experience a wildfire. About a 
quarter (26 percent) of homeowners say they live in an area likely to be impacted by a 
hurricane, and the same proportion say it is somewhat likely or very likely that their home 
would be damaged or destroyed by flooding. In the survey, 41 percent of homeowners said 
they took steps to protect their homes from natural disasters, up slightly from 38 percent in 
November 2016. . . . In 2020, 27 percent of homeowners policyholders said they had flood 
insurance, the highest level since the Triple-I began asking this question in 2007. However, 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) estimates seem to suggest that the percentage of 
homeowners who now have its flood insurance policies is much lower. It is possible that those 
with homeowners insurance believe they have flood coverage when they actually do not. One 
reason this may occur is that homeowners may not fundamentally understand what flood 
coverage is and how it works. Or they may think flood coverage encompasses water damage 
from a burst pipe instead of a weather-related event like a hurricane or from a river flooding. 
While the actual reason may be a combination of these misunderstandings, the discrepancy 
between those who have flood insurance and those who think they do presents an ongoing 
opportunity for insurers to inform their customers about the need to purchase flood insurance, 
whether from the NFIP or a private company.”). 
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The starting point is to return to the first premise: insurers want to sell as 
much insurance as they profitably can sell. Why don’t insurers already robustly sell 
hazard insurance without excluded peril priced in broad, undistorted risk pools? 
Because insurers cannot profitably do so. There may be a variety of explanations.175 
The intuitively obvious, arguably under-discussed explanation is that competitors 
will price cut this product every time. If the market gave the opportunity to profitably 
sell All Perils insurance priced in broad, undistorted risk pools, then one would 
expect at least one adequately capitalized insurer to be broadly and successfully 
selling it, because it would vastly increase gross profits by increasing the size and 
value of insurers’ portfolios. There is no such example in the market. 
And homeowners would buy it. Roughly two-thirds of homeowners would 
have no choice—hazard insurance is required by their mortgage. And many years 
of data report that at least three-quarters of the remaining homeowners still buy 
homeowner hazard insurance voluntarily. There has never been a moment in recent 
decades when, all-in, take-up rates of homeowner hazard insurance have been below 
90%.176 
As others, including French, have detailed, the tendency of homeowners to 
purchase homeowner hazard insurance provides an opportunity. The trick is to 
structure insurance markets so that all homeowner hazard insurance is All Perils and 
is priced across broad, undistorted risk pools, meaning it is not priced differently 
based on a property location. This can be achieved by cobbling together the core 
insights of the CDI, Kunreuther, and French. First, states should not approve 
homeowner hazard insurance rate filings if such rate filings exclude any natural 
disaster perils (Kunreuther).177 Second, states should not approve homeowner 
hazard insurance rate filings if such rate filings consider the risk of the disaster 
profile of the community that a property is located within (French).178 Finally, states 
should require that an insurer who sells anywhere in the states must sell 
everywhere.179  
This architecture sidesteps the political obstacles of French’s approach, 
incorporates the insights of Kunreuther’s approach while filling in its gaps, and 
addresses the questions left unresolved by the CDI’s approach. It is somewhat 
similar in approach and rationale to a proposal for natural disaster insurance for 
Western Europe, despite the distinct differences internally in some respects within 
Europe and externally from the United States in both social policy and in the way 
the insurance-business segment is structured.180 If all this is done, then insurers will 
 
 175. See generally Howard Kunreuther, All-Hazards Homeowners Insurance: A 
Possibility for the United States?, SOC’Y ACTUARIES (Feb. 2017), https://www.soa.org/
globalassets/assets/files/research/projects/2017-02-policy-homeowners-insurance.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K5MU-29JV]. 
 176. See supra Section II.A. 
 177. See Kunreuther, supra note 37. 
 178. See French, supra note 6, at 821–22. 
 179. See The Availability and Affordability of Coverage for Wildfire Loss in 
Residential Property Insurance in the Wildland-Urban Interface and Other High-Risk Areas 
of California: CDI Summary and Proposed Solutions, supra note 17, at 7. 
 180. See Donatella Porrini & Reimund Schwarze, Insurance Models and European 
Climate Change Policies: An Assessment, 38 EUR. J. LAW ECON. 7, 17 (2012). 
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be able to sell such insurance because there cannot be price-cutting through 
exclusion of a peril or a high-risk location. Homeowners will have All Perils 
insurance priced across broad, undistorted risk pools. And insurers will sell 
insurance everywhere because the alternative is to be excluded entirely. 
Structurally, any state should be able to adopt this proposal. It is easy for a 
state to decline to approve rate filings for homeowner hazard insurance that excludes 
coverage for losses caused by fire, wind, water, or earth movement. It is an easy 
thing for a state to require that an insurer who sells homeowner hazard insurance 
anywhere in a state must offer it everywhere in the state (essentially the CDI 
proposal without the escape hatch). But it might appear to be a far harder thing to 
use the rate filing review process to eliminate insurers pricing insurance as high-risk 
pools property in high-risk areas. 
This apparent problem, however, is not an actual conundrum because it is 
just a variant of a familiar tension in ratemaking. There is, was, and always will be 
tension between insurers and rate-makers concerning how an insurer uses data to 
package and re-package risk pools. Insurers always will seek ways to find metrics 
that can give an insurer a competitive advantage against other insurers (for example, 
credit-scoring or “good grades” discounts in auto insurance), and rate-makers will 
always be pressed to dig deep into the metrics being used and evaluate them for 
appropriateness.181 For example, rate-makers already dig beneath facially neutral 
rate-filings to identify state-identified, inappropriate, potential disparate impact on  
insureds on the basis of race.182 This is why it is not hard to identify how to regulate 
ratemaking to eliminate insurance isolating high-risk communities in high-risk 
pools.183 It merely requires adding a home’s location into the state’s extant list of 
identified, inappropriate, and disparate impact factors. 
 
 181. See, e.g., Insurers Don’t Like New Credit Scoring Ban in Washington, but Say 
They’ll Follow the Law, INS. J. (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/
west/2021/04/28/611881.htm [https://perma.cc/J79R-2GU2]. 
 182. See, e.g., Michael Ferullo & Roger Yu, Credit-Based Insurance Premiums 
Raise Concerns About Racial Bias, BLOOMBERG LAW (Dec. 22, 2020, 4:00 AM), 
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/insurance/credit-based-insurance-premiums-raise-
concerns-about-racial-bias [https://perma.cc/5P5L-2TMJ] (“Insurance regulators in 
Washington and Oregon are pushing to eliminate credit-based insurance scoring in property-
casualty products in the coming year, and legislation has been introduced in several states, 
including New York and New Jersey, and at the federal level.”); Brent Kabler, Insurance-
Based Credit Scores: Impact on Minority and Low Income Populations in Missouri, MO. 
DEP’T INS. (Jan. 2004), https://insurance.mo.gov/reports/credscore.pdf [https://perma.cc/
282C-7MXB ] (“The widespread use of credit scores to underwrite and price automobile and 
homeowners insurance has generated considerable concern that the practice may significantly 
restrict the availability of affordable insurance products to minority and low-income 
consumers.”). 
 183. See Manage Wildfire Risk at the Address Level, VERISK, https://www.verisk.
com/siteassets/media/downloads/underwriting/location/location-fireline.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4E43-CQTA] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021); Kathleen Pender, Do You Know Your Home’s 
Wildfire Risk Score? Your Insurance Company Does., S.F. CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2019, 5:11 PM), 
https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/networth/article/Do-you-know-your-home-s-
wildfire-risk-score-14905676.php [https://perma.cc/AT3A-S525] . 
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To repeat then, the architectural approach this Article suggests for assuring 
available, affordable insurance responding to all perils is a three-point proposal: 
first, an insurer who offers homeowner hazard insurance anywhere in a state must 
offer it everywhere.184 Second, rate filings for homeowner hazard insurance will not 
be approved if the insurance would exclude any natural disaster peril.185 Third, rate 
filings for homeowner hazard insurance will not be approved if the insurance 
discriminates against homes based on the location of the home.186  
VII. ANTICIPATED CRITICISMS 
A. Natural Disaster is Not Actually Insurable 
As Professors Koursky and Light describe, “economists have developed a 
framework of ideal insurability conditions. Namely, to be insurable, risks must be 
random, well-enough understood to make pricing and underwriting possible, 
diversifiable, and exist in markets with low levels of moral hazard and adverse 
selection.”187 The three-point proposal of this Article ticks every box. 
The first box—risks must be random—means, as Koursky and Light 
explain: 
There must be a risk, rather than a certainty. No insurer would write 
a policy for a known adverse event at a price less than the full cost 
because risk transfer in that situation produces no gain. Therefore, 
long-term, inevitable threats such as sea-level rise cannot typically be 
insured against. The risk in any given year of tidal flooding, however, 
may be insurable.188 
Private hazard insurance typically is written year-to-year.189 The 
catastrophe-modeling tools estimate the likelihood of a peril occurring and the 
impacts should it occur in any given year across an insurer’s portfolio. By this 
standard, the perils are insurable. 
The second box—pricing and underwriting are possible—means, as 
Koursky and Light explain: 
[T]he risk must be well-enough understood to allow for pricing and 
underwriting. If the risk is not well understood, insurers cannot 
determine how much premium to charge or whether a risk is worth 
adding to their portfolio. For instance, the insurer may worry about 
the potential for catastrophic losses if they price premiums too low or 
accept too many high risks. Often pricing is done using historic data, 
but also—especially for rare, changing, or uncertain risks—with 
 
 184. This idea is taken from the CDI approach (and slightly modified); it is not part 
of the Kunreuther proposal. 
 185. This idea is part of Kunreuther’s proposal. See Kunreuther, supra note 37. 
 186. This idea is new to the literature. 
 187. Carolyn Kousky & Sara E. Light, Insuring Nature, 69 DUKE L.J. 323, 355 
(2019). 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Paul Kleindorfer et al., Single-Year and Multi-Year Insurance Policies in 
a Competitive Market, 45 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 51, 52 (2012) (“Insurance policies for 
property insurance are normally issued as annual contracts . . . .”). 
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modeling. Risks do not have to be perfectly estimated, however, since 
insurers can and do charge higher prices for risks that are ambiguous 
or difficult to model. But if insurers are too uncertain about a risk, 
they may shy away from the market completely.190 
It appears this challenge has been solved—perils risk can be acceptably, 
accurately modeled.191 Or in the words of two of the largest modelers themselves: 
For over 30 years, RMS has led the way in transforming the 
catastrophe risk industry, helping organizations make better decisions 
to improve human and environmental outcomes. By combining 
proven modeling science with powerful advances in technology, 
RMS Risk Intelligence solutions enable clients to better assess risk 
and reduce uncertainty.192 
Need greater accuracy? RMS is known for precision.193 
In the case of rare but severe events, historical loss information 
has proven unreliable in assessing future loss potential. AIR 
Worldwide developed probabilistic models that help 
organizations prepare for the financial impacts of catastrophes—
before they occur. Today, organizations use AIR models to assess 
the likelihood and severity of loss from catastrophes in more than 
110 countries worldwide. AIR models capture how catastrophe 
behave and impact insurable assets using sophisticated simulation 
models . . . . Detailed output from AIR models is the basis for 
understanding and quantifying catastrophe risk. It is the 
“currency” by which risk is priced, transferred, and traded, and 
applications today go far beyond those within the insurance 
industry . . . . the models capture the full range of potential future 
catastrophe experience, including the most extreme events that 
may not have occurred historically.194 
 
 190. Kousky & Light, supra note 187, at 355–56. 
 191. See Tom Larsen, Catastrophe Risk Management, CORELOGIC 1–2, 
https://www.corelogic.com/downloadable-docs/2-catriskmgt-0216-01-catastrophe-risk-
management-021016.pdf [https://perma.cc/PD2W-8DSB] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021) 
(“Catastrophe modeling has become ubiquitous in the property insurance industry . . . . The 
early adopters . . . capitalizing on information asymmetry—having more information than 
their policy holders and competition . . . .”); accord Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, 
Should Governments Provide Catastrophe Insurance?, BERKELEY U.C. (Apr. 2006), 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/jaffee/papers/095BEPress06.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5R6-
JRDJ]. 
 192. Cloud-Based Analytics Provide Powerful Risk Insights, RMS, 
https://www.rms.com/risk-analytics [https://perma.cc/K3Y4-JVZR] (last visited Aug. 6, 
2021). 
 193. Discover How RMS Helps Customers Outperform, RMS, 
https://www.rms.com/risk-analytics/why-rms-infographic [https://perma.cc/MH4E-LTSU] 
(last visited Aug. 6, 2021). 
 194. About Catastrophe Modeling, AIR, https://www.air-worldwide.com/models/
About-Catastrophe-Modeling/ [https://perma.cc/2X3U-Q4UV] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021); 
 
716 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 63:1 
   
 
Increasing uncertainty with regard to the severity and frequency 
of catastrophic events is challenging the P&C insurance industry 
to revisit existing catastrophic risk management and loss 
adjustment strategies by improving the overall understanding of 
all natural hazards. With 6 continents, 100+ countries/territories, 
and 185+ models, CoreLogic has the breadth, depth, and 
granularity to get you the data you need, enabling you to stand 
with us at the forefront of nxt-level catastrophe modeling.195 
Touters tout. But AIR and CoreLogic have gone beyond advertising 
puffery—AIR has represented to the federal government that it can and does do 
catastrophe modeling down to the granularity of a single property address, and 
CoreLogic has represented to the federal government that its granularity reaches to 
individual structures within a multi-structure property address.196 Further, the 
market has tested these claims, and insurers are using these models and writing 
insurance relying upon them.197 It would seem the second box is ticked. And yes, 
some insurers are pulling back from insuring some communities.198 But disaster is 
everywhere in some form or fashion, and insurers broadly remain in the markets.199 
The third box—the risk is diversified—means, as Koursky and Light 
explain: 
[R]isk pooling must be possible. This requires a substantial number 
of insureds whose risks are independent of each other and for which 
catastrophic losses are not possible. These are the conditions under 
which the average claim approaches the expected value (thanks to the 
 
see Catastrophe Modeling: Why All the Fuss?, MARSH, https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/
research/catastrophe-modeling.html [https://perma.cc/T8MK-XHF6] (last visited Aug. 6, 
2021). 
 195. Catastrophe Risk Management Solutions, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.
com/protect/catastrophe-risk-management-solutions/ [https://perma.cc/3MM8-TG86] (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 196. FHFA Public Listening Session on Climate and Natural Disaster Risk 
Management at the Regulated Entities, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, 1:12:10–1:31:55 (Mar. 4, 
2021), https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Pages/FHFA-Public-Listening-Session-on-Climate-
and-Natural-Disaster-Risk-Management-at-the-Regulated-Entities.aspx [https://perma.cc/
TNW9-MBBJ] (“Most importantly, in the context of mortgage portfolios, the models 
calculate the financial loss . . . . to estimate potential losses from extreme events . . . . at the 
property level . . . . we have to get to a property-by-property assessment, and that’s what 
we’ve been able to do. So, with the tool that we have built, we’re able to give you a composite 
score property by property, centroid by centroid, structure by structure on a property.”). 
 197. See, e.g., Our Clients, AIR, https://www.air-worldwide.com/about-air/Our-
Clients/ [https://perma.cc/3VYM-3HTG] (last visited Aug. 6, 2021). 
 198. See Salisbury, supra note 2. 
 199. See generally Bethan Moorcraft, More Choice—An Answer to America’s 
Gaping Flood Protection Gap, INS. BUS. AM. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.
insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/catastrophe/more-choice—an-answer-to-americas-
gaping-flood-protection-gap-246475.aspx [https://perma.cc/T6R5-VZUX] (“This is an area 
where private flood insurers have an advantage in that most are using cutting edge data 
analytics tools . . . . which can differentiate flood risk between neighborhood properties on 
the same street . . . .”). 
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Law of Large Numbers) and the policyholder’s expected loss will be 
approximated by the population’s expected loss (thanks to the Central 
Limit Theorem).200 
This is the precise problem that is emerging nationally with increasing 
frequency, and it is the “availability” focus of this Article, the CDI approach, and 
the French approach. The solution is not novel: have broad, undistorted risk pools. 
This Article’s three-point proposal addresses this by a “write anywhere, write 
everywhere” rule coupled with an imposed form of community pricing. It is CDI’s 
idea without the escape hatch. 
The fourth and final box—moral hazard and adverse selection—means, as 
Koursky and Light explain: 
Finally, the market must also be subject to minimal levels of moral 
hazard and adverse selection. . . . Insurance premiums in a well-
functioning private market are directly tied to the risk. Although 
regulators may suppress prices, in most private insurance markets, 
insurers still charge higher prices for higher risks. This means 
insurance markets may be able to create incentives to reduce risk by 
rewarding insureds’ investments in risk reduction with lower 
premiums.201 
French aptly addresses moral hazard and adverse selection concerns.202 
This Article does not mean to minimize those concerns. But crucially, in the sphere 
of homeowner hazard insurance it does not generally appear that homeowners act in 
moral hazard or adverse selection ways. When homeowners are broadly offered 
hazard insurance, about 75% or more buy it without regard to perceived peril risk.203 
Conversely, when homeowners in a high-risk flood zone are not mandated to buy 
flood insurance, most don’t.204 Neither behavior is consistent with the predictions of 
the theories of adverse selection or moral hazard. And, of course, under this proposal 
most homeowners will not be a position to adversely select; rather, roughly two-
thirds of homeowners will be required by their mortgage to buy All Perils insurance. 
Finally, working within the Koursky and Light articulation of the concern, the 
response is to impose mitigation measures into an insurance policy (as the CDI 
approach would). Insurers can and should set mitigation standards and cost rewards 
in policies. Nothing prevents it. Insurers do it. This criterion too is met. 
B. Insurers Will Pull Out of the Market205 
Related to the concern that catastrophe is not insurable is the concern that 
the more “socialized” insurance is, the less likely insurers are to sell it. Or put more 
bluntly, insurers will leave the market. 
 
 200. Kousky & Light, supra note 187, at  356. 
 201. Id. at 357. 
 202. French, supra note 6, at 861–63. 
 203. See supra Section II.B. 
 204. See supra Section II.B. 
 205. The ideas discussed in this Section supplement the reasons already articulated 
by Kunreuther. Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 9. 
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It would be hubris to guarantee this won’t happen. But given that there are, 
for example, over 6,000,000 owner-occupied homes in Florida,206 and all the visible 
data indicate that over 90% of these homeowners buy hazard insurance,207 it is hard 
to imagine that insurers who can profitably compete in that market will abandon it. 
There is a concrete example suggesting that homeowners will not be left 
with no provider of private insurance. In the sphere of health insurance, community 
rating has resulted in some private insurers refusing to insure but has not resulted in 
any community having no options for private insurance.208 This suggests that if all 
insurers are playing on a level playing field, such that an insurer does not need to 
segment insurance by covered risk or likelihood of an insured experiencing a loss, 
then in a carefully structured market private insurers can and will continue to 
profitably offer insurance.209 
Yet insurers could leave. And if they do, then the market has spoken. 
Catastrophe is not insurable by private insurers. But then so too would there no 
longer be insurance-industry opposition to the French approach,210 which, in turn, 
would be the necessary predicate for the French proposal to blossom into political 
reality. 
C. It Will Be Unaffordable 
A related concern to “insurers will leave” is that insurers will stay but that 
this will not be of much help to homeowners, because insurance under this Article’s 
three-point proposal will be unaffordable to many homeowners. 
 
 206. QuickFacts Florida, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/FL/RHI725219 [https://perma.cc/74RE-K2D8] (last visited Aug. 8, 
2021). 
 207. Claire, supra note 72.  
 208. Five states—Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Vermont—
have community rating and were able to have private insurers offer coverage in the time of 
mandated purchase of health insurance. See generally PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 
Challenges of Partial Reform–Lessons from State to Reform the Individual and Small Group 
Market Before the Affordable Care Act, CAL. HEALTH CARE FOUND. (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.chcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/PDF-ChallengesStateReformBefore
ACA.pdf [https://perma.cc/NL8P-QVSL]; Justin Giovannelli & Kevin Lucia, State 
Experiences Show Why Repealing the ACA’s Premium Subsidies and Individual Mandate 
Would Cripple Individual Health Insurance Markets, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Jan. 20, 2017), 
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2017/state-experiences-show-why-repealing-
acas-premium-subsidies-and-individual-mandate-would [https://perma.cc/5VGF-YPGH]. 
Even in the absence of mandated health insurance, there is no place in the United States that 
has no private insurer offering health insurance, and in these five states every place has 
multiple private insurers. County by County Plan Year 2020 Insurer Participation in Health 
Insurance Exchanges, CMS, https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Programs-and-Initiatives/Health-
Insurance-Marketplaces/Downloads/Final-2020-County-Coverage-Map.pdf [https://perma.
cc/B5FL-YMY9] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 209. See Matthew Fielder, Taking Stock of Insurer Financial Performance in the 
Individual Health Insurance Market Through 2017, BROOKINGS (Oct. 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/individualmarketprofitability.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B6RL-ZLYH]. 
 210. See supra Section V.C. 
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That is a hard concern to address because, before this Article, there has not 
been a publicly reported calculation of what private, All Perils insurance would cost 
a homeowner on average. Indeed, there has not been any publicly reported data set 
from which such a calculation could even be easily derived. 
Any discussion of what this sort of insurance would cost must start with 
this: Insurers either know or could easily calculate what it would cost. The challenge 
is to get an idea of cost from public-facing information. 
As Koursky details, “[t]he thorny theoretical problems involved in 
estimating the economic consequences of disasters are coupled with extreme data 
limitations that make actual estimates far from what would be the hypothetical ‘true’ 
disaster costs.”211 Or, put more simply, it is hard (nigh on impossible) to get good 
public data. 
In theory, the calculation could be straightforward—divide the total 
economic damage to owner-occupied homes in a state in a year by the number of 
owner-occupied homes in the state in that year, and then adjust the resulting figure 
by profit and overhead factors to result in average per home direct premium. But it 
is difficult to isolate state-by-state, regional, or event-level aggregation of 
catastrophe loss to owner-occupied homes that can be matched to the number of 
potentially insurable homes in the footprint of the aggregated loss.212 This requires 
data on both insured and uninsured-but-insurable losses,213 isolated to owner-
occupied homes. Available data are overinclusive or underinclusive, or both. 
Further, what data are available are reported as economic loss, which is different 
from cost to insure, as it excludes the administrative and profit components of 
privately insuring. 
California, for example, when studying wildfire, only collects data on 
insured loss.214 In 2018, California reported that insured losses to homes totaled 
$11.4 billion, but did not report total losses, whether insured or uninsured.215 And 
complicating matters further, this data included losses without disaggregation to 
“Homeowners; Condominium Unit Owners; Mobile Home; Tenants/Renters; 
Dwelling Fire and Allied Lines; and Lender/Force-Placed and Real Estate Owned 
 
 211. Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate Adaptation: A Review of the Economic 
Costs of Natural Disasters, 46 ENERGY ECON. 576, 580 (2014). 
 212. See email from Seth Christensen, Tex. Dep’t Emer. Mgmt., to Author (Feb. 
10, 2020, 9:37 AM) (on file with author) (responding to a public records request, officially 
representing that the State has no such data); email from Joan Batten, Pub. Recs. Coordinator 
for Fla. Off. Ins. Regul., to Author (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:45 AM) (on file with author) (responding 
to a public records request, describing the nature of the data the State has and does not have). 
 213. Researchers using a Monte Carlo simulation tool found that in the United 
States, uninsured expected property loss from natural catastrophes should exceed insured loss. 
Thomas Holzheu & Ginger Turner, The Natural Catastrophe Protection Gap: Measurement, 
Root Causes and Ways of Addressing Underinsurance for Extreme Events, 43 GENEVA 
PAPERS ON RISK & INS.–ISSUES & PRAC. 37, 48, fig.3 (2018). 
 214. Email from Camilo Pizarro, Manager, Cal. Dep’t Ins., to Author (Feb. 3, 2020, 
3:34 PM) (on file with author). 
 215. Insured Losses from the 2018 California Wildfire, CAL. DEP’T INS., 
http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2019/upload/nr041-19Insured
Losses2018Wildfires050819.pdf [https://perma.cc/G6VB-Z4FN] (last visited Feb. 4, 2020). 
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(REO).”216 Put another way, the data did not support isolating uninsured, insured 
losses to owner-occupied homes.217 
California is not an outlier. State governments simply do not collect data 
on economic losses—insured and uninsured—to owner-occupied homes. In 
response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request on all economic losses 
to homes (whether insured or not) in Florida in 2017, the Florida Office of Insurance 
Regulation reported that it performed a data call on Hurricane Irma (the only major 
storm hitting Florida in 2017) but did not collect any data on uninsured losses, and 
it suggested the Florida Division of Emergency Management might have collected 
data on uninsured losses.218 The Florida Division of Emergency Management 
reported it did not “have records that would show monetary damages to homes” but 
perhaps the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation would.219 Similarly, the author 
of the flood analysis work commissioned by the State of Texas220 confirms that he 
has no data on uninsured loss.221 Nor does the State of Texas Department of 
Insurance.222 
Similarly unhelpful is NOAA data on flood loss. While NOAA tracks 
economic direct damage from floods, “the NOAA loss estimates include damage 
from freshwater flooding and rainfall from hurricanes, but they omit damage from 
other coastal flooding (e.g., storm surge) [and] . . . it is likely that a substantial 
portion of flood-related direct damage is to uninsured property.”223 
One of the most comprehensive public-facing studies is the work done by 
the City of Houston after Hurricane Harvey. The City of Houston estimates that in 
 
 216. Id. 
 217. Email from Luciano Gobbo, Manager, Cal. Dep’t Ins., to Author (Feb. 4, 2020, 
2:58 PM) (on file with author) (stating that California’s reported data on residential property 
loss does not disaggregate data “further than personal residential property, commercial 
property, auto, and other. Thus personal residential property includes homeowners, dwelling 
fire, tenant/renters, condo, mobile home, etc. and was not reported by the different types. 
Tenant/Renters provides coverage to one’s content regardless if individual lives in an 
apartment complex or in a single family home.”). 
 218. Email from Joan Batten, Pub. Recs. Coordinator Fla. Off. Ins. Regul., to 
Author (Sept. 17, 2019, 6:45 AM) (on file with author) (responding to a public records 
request, describing the nature of the data the State has and does not have, to Author). 
 219. Email from Sherin Joseph, Attorney, Fla. Dep’t Emergency Mgmt., to Author 
(Sept. 20, 2019, 11:55 AM) (on file with author). 
 220. Rebuild Texas, CTR. FOR TEX. BEACHES & SHORES, 
http://www.texascoastalatlas.com/TexasAtlas/splash%20screen/splash.html [https://perma.
cc/VL26-WUJC] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 221. Email from Sam Brody, Lead Technical Expert, Governor’s Comm’n to 
Rebuild Tex., to Author (Dec. 13, 2019, 8:18 AM) (on file with author). 
 222. Email from Marianne Baker, Dir., Property & Casualty Div.—Prop. & 
Casualty Lines Div., Tex. Dep’t Ins., to Author (Feb. 4, 2020, 9:11 AM) (on file with author) 
(“We don’t collect data on damages to homes that were uninsured.”). 
 223. Framing the Challenge of Urban Flooding in the United States, NAT’L ACADS. 
OF SCIS., ENG’G, & ME. 32, https://doi.org/10.17226/25381 (last visited Aug. 08, 2021). 
2021] ASHES TO ASHES 721 
   
 
2017, Hurricane Harvey caused $16 billion in residential damage.224 That figure 
does not disaggregate owners from renters, single-family units from multi-family 
units from group homes, or on-site construction from manufactured homes.225 
Industry data is no better. In the insurance industry, catastrophe risk 
modelers do not have this data. For example, CoreLogic, self-described as at the 
“forefront of next-level catastrophe modeling,”226 disclaims that it has “any data on 
the breakdown by percentage, within insurable causes, of residential total losses 
(entire structure—whether including foundation or not—requires reconstruction) 
that are caused by natural disasters causes vs. any other causes.”227 
Reinsurer Swiss Re estimates globally “the expected uninsured losses from 
natural disasters of USD 153 billion annually.”228 That figure makes no distinction 
between whether the loss was to a home or some other type of property such as an 
apartment or business, nor breaks down the figure by nation. 
In the end, there is no obvious public data set to base a calculation of what 
it would cost an average homeowner to buy private All Perils insurance. But obvious 
data is different from “no data.” There is some public-facing data. Deep in work 
performed for the NAIC, an accounting firm, Milliman, has a stray line where 
Milliman estimated “the potential private residential flood insurance market to 
represent between $34 billion and $48 billion in direct written premium.”229 The 
calculation was developed from “an input file representative of single-family 
homeowners in contiguous United States;” “assumed ‘policy limits’ similar to a 
homeowners policy——full insurance to value for building coverage, plus 
additional coverage for contents, ALE, other structures;” “used multiple catastrophe 
models to estimate and AAL an insurer might use;” and “built in an estimated 
expense range for all expenses[] and covered loss plus LAE plus anything else 
included in running the business——in other words, the actual cost to the collective 
insureds in paid premium if all covered losses were fully covered (the coverage 
 
 224. The Harvey Data Project: City of Houston Housing and Community 
Development Department, CITY HOUSTON TEX. 2 (Mar. 2019), https://www.houstontx.
gov/postharvey/public/documents/3.2019-havrvey-data-project.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M5B-
6BDV]. 
 225. Local Housing Needs Assessment: Hurricane Harvey Housing Recovery, CITY 
HOUSTON TEX. 105–60, https://houstontx.gov/housing/plans-reports/Local-Housing-Needs-
Assessment-112818.pdf [https://perma.cc/FAE4-MWGL] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 226. Catastrophe Risk Management Solutions, CORELOGIC, https://www.corelogic.
com/solutions/catastrophe-risk-management.aspx [https://perma.cc/TAS8-M4DC] (last 
visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 227. Email from Sarah Jakubiak, Pro. Exec. Assistant, CoreLogic, to Author (June 
26, 2020, 7:16 AM) (on file with author) (responding to request for clarification following a 
CoreLogic webinar on natural disaster loss modeling). 
 228. Swiss Re Ltd., Underinsurance of Property Risks: Closing the Gap, RISK & 
INSURANCE 1, https://riskandinsurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Swiss-Re_
Underinsurance-of-property-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/HU32-PT5C] (last visited Aug. 24, 
2021). 
 229. Considerations for State Insurance Regulators in Building the Private Flood 
Insurance Market, NAIC 11–12 (Nov. 19, 2019), https://content.naic.org/sites/default/files/
national_meeting/CATWG%20materials%20without%20agenda.pdf [https://perma.cc/
55HW-R4BS] (pages 73–74 of pdf). 
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limits were adequate to fully cover the loss).”230 Thus, Milliman had calculated the 
total in annual premiums all homeowners would pay if every homeowner in the 
United States had flood insurance. 
Milliman’s work can be used to derive an approximate cost of direct written 
premium for private residential All Perils insurance based on the ratio of insured 
flood peril to all perils. Steve Bowen, a Director and Meteorologist for Aon, is Aon’s 
Head of Catastrophe Insight within its Impact Forecasting Department and one of 
the authors of Aon’s Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight 2019 Annual 
Report.231 I asked Mr. Bowen: 
In a typical year, of all annual economic loss from natural 
disasters in the United States, what percentage of economic loss 
is due to flood? For these purposes, I define “economic loss from 
flood” as a loss that if one had a flood insurance policy, then 
coverage would respond.232 
He answered: 
Flood is a broad term that includes riverine, flash flood, storm 
surge, coastal flood and is often bucketed within different perils – 
namely tropical cyclone, severe convective storm, or winter 
weather. These impacts are typically incurred via direct costs to 
property, vehicles, infrastructure, agriculture, and net-loss 
business interruption. Only a fraction of these economic damage 
costs is covered by insurance. In the case of damage to homes and 
businesses, less than 10 percent of US homeowners have NFIP 
policies. 
With these metrics in mind, I can provide you some numbers with 
broad assumptions that does include a fair amount of uncertainty. 
The mainland U.S. has averaged $80 billion in economic damage 
from natural disasters since 2000 (all values inflation adjusted to 
2020 USD). Based on some assumptions to account for flood-
related impacts from tropical cyclones, thunderstorms, and winter 
storms, that roughly equates to $27 billion; or about one-third of 
annual direct disaster-related economic costs.233 
Applying the 27/80 ratio to Milliman’s figures results in a range of annual 
average direct written premium for all economic damage from natural disasters to 
owner-occupied homes in the United States of about $100.74 billion to $142.22 
billion. 
 
 230. Email from Nancy Watkins, Principal & Consulting Actuary, to Author (Feb. 
26, 2020, 6:16 PM) (on file with author) (responding to follow-up questions about a 
presentation Ms. Watkins made to the NAIC). 
 231. Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, supra note 8, at 81. 
 232. Email from Author to Steve Bowen, Dir. & Meteorologist, Head Catastrophe 
Insight Impact Forecasting, Aon (Feb. 27, 2020, 1:20 PM) (on file with author). 
 233. Email from Steve Bowen, Dir. & Meteorologist, Head Catastrophe Insight 
Impact Forecasting, Aon, to Author (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:18 PM) (on file with author). 
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This ratio, in turn, can be used to calculate an average per house cost of 
direct written premium for every owner-occupied house in the United States. As of 
July 1, 2019, U.S. Census Bureau statistics describe 89,397,916 owner-occupied 
homes in the United States.234 Spreading the total calculated direct premium across 
every one of these homes results in a “back of the envelope” per home direct 
premium range of $1,127–$1,591. 
This calculation comes with a host of assumptions and caveats. It calculates 
a per house cost, but insurance premiums are not per house capitated235 within 
underwriting pools. It is calculated by spreading data nationally, but insurance is 
priced—even in its theoretically broadest form—on a state-by-state basis. 
Milliman’s figures have a very broad error range, and the model then builds on that 
range using Bowen’s numbers, which he self-describes as based on a “fair amount 
of uncertainty.”236 Aon’s numbers are across residential, commercial, and 
agricultural numbers,237 and so the resulting ratio calculation assumes that the ratio 
holds regardless of whether the impact is confined to only one of these spheres. Also, 
the denominator may be suspect—the most recent American Housing Survey 
suggests that in 2017, there were only 72,526,000 owner-occupied attached or 
detached homes which were not “Manufactured/mobile home or trailer” (a different 
sort of insurance policy) or “Other” (boat, RV, van, etc.).238 
Nonetheless, this calculation allows at least some analysis of whether the 
proposal of this Article will cost too much. There are some other data calculations 
that suggest $1,127–$1,591 per house might be in the ballpark. In 2017, the average 
premium nationally for HO-3 coverage for homes was $1,211, with Louisiana being 
most expensive at $1,968 and Oregon being least expensive at $677;239 in 2017, fire 
and lightning, wind and hail, and water damage and freezing accounted for 92.8% 
of all property damage claims made on HO-2, HO-3, and HO-5 homeowners 
insurance policies;240 and HO-3 is coverage for wind and fire but not flood and 
earthquake.241 Using ISO loss estimates and U.S. Census Bureau data, economic fire 
 
 234. Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/WTZ8-EVBJ] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (stating 
that there were 139,684,244 housing units as of July 1, 2019, multiplied by the owner-
occupied housing unit rate, 2014–2018, of 64%). 
 235. See, e.g., How Home Insurance Premiums Are Calculated, TD INS., 
https://www.tdinsurance.com/products-services/home-insurance/tips-advice/premium-
calculations [https://perma.cc/7PWP-UJR6] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 236. Email from Steve Bowen, Dir. & Meteorologist, Head Catastrophe Insight 
Impact Forecasting, Aon, to Author (Feb. 28, 2020, 3:18 PM) (on file with author). 
 237. Weather, Climate & Catastrophe Insight, supra note 8, at 78. 
 238. See American Housing Survey (AHS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas
=00000&s_year=2017&s_tablename=TABLE1&s_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergr
oup1=2&s_filtergroup2=1 (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (click “Get Table”). 
 239. 2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 108–10. 
 240. Id. at 111. 
 241. For a more fulsome discussion of the HO-3 form, see Report Providing an 
Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural Catastrophe Insurance in the 
United States, supra note 7, at 14–15, 18–26. 
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losses in the United States in 2018 cost just $133.21 per capita,242 which if multiplied 
out by the 2018 population of the country (about 330 million243) and then divided 
by the Census Bureau’s figure of 89 million owner-occupied homes244 equates to 
$494 per house. That figure leaves plenty of room for coverage of other perils and 
for insurer overhead and profit. And finally, French calculates the cost of his 
approach as $1,171.245 
But is the cost, assuming it is $1,127–$1,591, affordable? For an individual 
homeowner, that will be an idiosyncratic answer. But what is clear is that this cost 
would not be a deviation of significance from what homeowners already, on 
average, are paying. It bears repeating that the I.I.I. reports as to the most recent year 
for which it has collected data, and in 2017, the average expenditure of U.S. 
homeowners for insurance for hazard insurance was $1,211.246 
D. Homeowners Will Not Want It 
A closely related concern to “homeowners can’t afford it” is that 
homeowners can afford it but won’t choose to buy it. Put another way, homeowners 
who can afford All Perils insurance will perceive it as costing too much—it just will 
not be perceived as a good buy. Or put in the jargon of economists, there will be 
significant price elasticity. This is an important concern to square up to, because 
economists recognize that insureds undervalue low-probability, high-consequence 
risks.247 
Whatever the theoretical concern about price elasticity, it does not bear out 
in the real world of buying peril insurance. Kunreuther summarizes the prior 
research confirming that, “by bundling hazards into a single policy, property owners 
are likely to perceive the risk to be sufficiently high that they will want to purchase 
coverage prior to experiencing a disaster.”248 Further, as summarized above, other 
research confirms that over 90% of homeowners do have and want hazard insurance 
and are not price elastic about the cost. 
An equally encouraging response to price elasticity concerns is a 2020 
paper empirically evaluating homeowner willingness to purchase All Perils 
insurance. Global pricing of property insurance rose 20% in the fourth quarter of 
 
 242. 2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 166. 
 243. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.
census.gov/popclock/ [https://perma.cc/5YMZ-Z7MX] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021). 
 244. Quick Facts, supra note 235. 
 245. French, supra note 6, at 859. 
 246. 2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 108. 
 247. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Robert Meyer & Erwann Michel-Kerjan, 
Overcoming Decision Biases to Reduce Losses from Natural Catastrophes, in THE 
BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC POLICY (Eldar Shafer, ed. 2013) (“[I]ndividuals often 
utilize informal heuristics that have proven useful . . . but that are likely to be unsuccessful 
when applied to the kind of low-probability, high-stakes decisions they are now facing in a 
catastrophic environment.”); accord Andrew Royal, Dynamics in Risk Taking with a Low-
Probability Hazard, 55 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 41 (2017). 
 248. Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 143. 
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2020 and an additional 15% in the first quarter of 2021.249 That said, Landry et al. 
specifically studied the willingness of homeowners to pay for All Perils coverage 
and found that the premium homeowners were willing to pay for All Perils insurance 
was $3,393.65–$4,396.93, while a homeowner who has separately purchased “flood 
insurance, wind insurance, and a standard homeowners policy pays on average 
$3,152 in premiums for all three types of coverage.”250 In other words, this Article’s 
proposal apparently is well within the price elasticity pain point for All Perils 
coverage. 
E. It is Politically Untenable 
There will be concern about the political headwinds that this three-point 
proposal may face. Natural disasters affect people and communities differently. The 
cost of insurance breaks differently amongst different communities. These 
differences can create political tensions that regulators and legislators must 
anticipate and navigate. 
1. Rich v. poor 
As alluded in the discussion of cost, what is a good buy to one person is a 
barrier to entry to another person. A $1,211 hazard insurance policy is a great buy 
for a $1,000,000 home and a far less attractive price for a $50,000 home. The median 
home value of owner-occupied homes in the United States is $200,000,251 which 
suggests that a state could think of the predicted price as “per $200,000 of home 
value” rather than “per house” and thus understand the affordability of all perils in 
that state. 
Of course, this sort of re-framing only goes so far. If one compares the 2017 
reported median home values in California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia,252 with average 
insurance premiums for homeowner insurance in those states in 2017,253 there is no 
correlation. Home value is a dependent variable, but far from the only one. 
The most obvious “other” variable would be the risk profile of a property. 
The impact of that variable will be reduced under this Article’s three-point proposal 
to whatever degree a state decides to do it. There could be a single, state-wide risk-
pool, or something less. 
 
 249. Matthew Lerner, Global Price Increases Slow in Q1, BUS. INS. (May 4, 2021), 
https://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20210504/NEWS06/912341621/Global-
insurance-price-increases-slow-in-Q1-Marsh- [https://perma.cc/FBD6-N73J]. 
 250. Landry et al., supra note 67, at 22. 
 251. American Housing Survey, supra note 92. 
 252. The American Housing Survey tracks median home values for California, 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
and Virginia; however, for Colorado and Ohio there is no reported 2017 data. See American 
Housing Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/ahs/data/
interactive/ahstablecreator.html?s_areas=00008&s_year=2015&s_tablename=TABLE13&s
_bygroup1=1&s_bygroup2=1&s_filtergroup1=1&s_filtergroup2=1 (last visited Aug. 8, 
2021) (click “Get Table”). 
 253. 2020 Insurance Fact Book, supra note 16, at 108–10. 
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But under any approach there will be income disparities. There will be rich 
households who do not need any insurance premium reduction but will realize it. 
And there will be poor households who either have a premium increase they cannot 
afford or an insufficient premium reduction to gain entry to the housing market. 
Restructuring the homeowner insurance market will not solve these wealth 
inequity issues. That is what governments do through programs such as subsidies 
and vouchers.254 But these issues should not be ignored.255 
2. Racial injustice 
In the context of this Article’s proposal, wealth disparity and racial 
injustice are related concerns. Eroding homeowner insurance availability and 
affordability inevitably erodes homeownership.256 Communities of color suffer a 
homeownership gap.257 And lack of ownership may have unexpected, knock-on, 
negative effects beyond concerns about intergenerational wealth accumulation. For 
example, literature suggests that “variations in home ownership may contribute to 
persistent racial and socioeconomic health inequities.”258 The availability of disaster 
 
 254. See Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 147–49 (arguing for government response 
to cost inequity but also arguing that vouchers are highly preferred to subsidies). 
 255. See Robert E. Litan et al., Easing the Homeowners’ Insurance Crisis on the 
Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, DOCPLAYER (Oct. 2007), https://docplayer.net/15624827-Easing-
the-homeowners-insurance-crisis-on-the-atlantic-and-gulf-coasts-robert-e-litan-1-frank-
nutter-2-marc-racicot-3.html [https://perma.cc/3BTV-BG6V]. 
 256. See generally Flood Insurance Coverage of Federal Housing Administration 
Single-Family Homes, supra note 78, at vii–viii, 27–39, 42–43 (higher flood insurance 
premium amounts correlate to likelihood of mortgage loan default); accord Clifford V. Rossi, 
Assessing the Impact of Hurricane Frequency and Intensity on Mortgage Default Rates, FED. 
HOUS. FIN. AGENCY 25, https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Documents/HurricaneImpactAnalysis–
DrCliffordRossi.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MG8-BYNL] (last visited Aug. 8, 2021) (describing 
how increased frequency and intensity of hurricanes increases mortgage default rates). 
 257. Laurie S. Goodman & Christopher Mayer, Homeownership and the American 
Dream, 32 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 31, 36–37 (2018); accord Lindsay Owens, Soaked: A 
Policy Agenda to Prepare for a Climate-Triggered Housing Crash, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY 
11 (July 2020), https://www.fhfa.gov/Videos/Documents/ClimateandHousingReport–Dr-
Lindsay-Owens.pdf [https://perma.cc/9V8E-BQDT] (asserting communities of color “are 
even more likely to be impacted by climate change and to experience blight and abandonment, 
as they are less likely than white communities to be aided and rebuilt.”). 
 258. Roshanak Mehdipanah et al., Neighborhood Context, Homeownership and 
Home Value: An Ecological Analysis of Implications for Health, 14 INT. J. ENV’T RSCH. PUB. 
HEALTH 1098, 1098 (2017). See generally William M. Rohe & Michael A. Stegman, The 
Effects of Homeownership: On the Self-Esteem, Perceived Control and Life Satisfaction of 
Low-Income People, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASSOC. 173 (2007) (showing that homeownership 
results in a significant increase in life satisfaction); Glen Bramley & Noah Kofi Karley, 
Homeownership, Poverty and Educational Achievement: School Effects as Neighbourhood 
Effects, 22 HOUS. STUD. 693 (2007) (discussing how homeownership affects school 
attainment); Dalton Conley & Brian Gifford, Home Ownership, Social Insurance, and the 
Welfare State, 21 SOCIO. F. 55 (2006); Urb. Inst., Climate and Natural Disaster Risk 
Management Request for Input, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY (Apr. 19, 2021), 
https://www.fhfa.gov//AboutUs/Contact/Pages/input-submission-detail.aspx?RFIId=1442 
(click “FHFA Climate RFI - Urban Institute Response.pdf”). But see Stephanie M. Stern, 
Reassessing the Citizen Virtues of Homeownership, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 890 (2011). 
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mitigation resources specifically also can break differently on racial lines.259 The 
point here is simple and disquieting: insurance unavailability and unaffordability 
can exacerbate racial injustice in the United States.  
This Article presents only an economic proposal. In other words, this 
proposal does not explicitly address environmental racism, but this proposal also 
should not be considered independently of understanding whether it exacerbates, 
ameliorates, or is neutral to environmental racism. Disparate impacts are a moral 
and political reality that any governmental action always must account for.  
The issue is an enormous one and is a paper in itself—well beyond this 
Article. But it would seem, at least on an intuitive level, that making homeowner 
insurance more affordable and available is helpful, not hurtful, on metrics of 
environmental racism. 
3. Industry opposition 
There is an obvious reason that insurers will be less concerned with this 
Article’s three-point proposal than with the French approach—this proposal does 
not seek to eliminate their business. But is it enough? 
It is too simplistic to postulate that the insurance industry will act as a single 
entity, unanimous amongst its component companies, and oppose. Arguably this 
proposal is actually positive for the industry as a whole. More gross risk will be 
covered. Most dramatically, the take up rate of coverage of earthquake and flood 
peril should rise to about 90%.  
As Kunreuther articulates, risk must be actuarily and soundly written.260 
This Article’s proposal in no way assumes that insurers will price risk other than 
profitably. If take-up of earthquake and flood insurance rises from less than 20 
percent to over 90 percent, then even if profit margins do not change, gross profits 
will. They will rise—dramatically. There are no restrictions on covered risk, in 
gross, being profitably underwritten. And so gross industry underwriting profits will 
rise. And if gross profits across the industry segment rise, then the industry should 
be, on the whole, enthused. 
But as with all things, there will be winners and losers. Insurers who 
anticipate profiting from the proposal will support it. Other insurers will have the 
opposite calculus and oppose. Most notably, small insurers who can write regionally 
but not statewide will oppose. 
 
 259. See, e.g., James R. Elliott et al., Racial Inequities in the Federal Buyout of 
Flood-Prone Homes: A Nationwide Assessment of Environmental Adaption, 6 SOCIUS 1, 12 
(2020) (“[R]acialization is now occurring in new ways that provide more opportunities to 
whiter communities to participate in the latest wave of federal flood mitigation, while leaving 
neighborhoods of color more likely either to consent or face future flood risks. This dynamic 
is not a contradiction. It is how privilege seems to work in the age of climate change . . . . It 
brings more options and public resources to those living in more socially advantaged spaces, 
especially if they own property, while leaving those in socially marginalized spaces more 
reliant on government assistance that is not only less likely to come but less trusted when it 
does.”). 
 260. Kunreuther, supra note 37, at 146–47. 
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No doubt, the instinctive response of the industry to any restriction on 
ratemaking is negative. But the industry is the very opposite of emotional and 
precipitous in its actions; the lifeblood of insurance is cold data analytics.261 If this 
proposal pencils out positively for the industry as a whole, then the weight of the 
industry will support it. 
4. Public insurers 
There is a politically attractive aspect of this proposal: it removes public 
entities from the uncomfortable position of public insurer of last resort. One might 
characterize the NFIP as the poster child for, in French’s words, “a failing insurance 
program.”262 But it’s not as if any other public insurance product is thriving. There 
is no example of public peril insurance of last resort that the offering state 
government wants to offer. 
5. Each state is different 
Finally, there is the concern that different states experience natural disaster 
differently, because “generally, an insurer is required to obtain approval from the 
state insurance regulator for all of the homeowner insurance policy forms that the 
insurer intends to use in that state.”263 Or put another way, for some states there is a 
crisis, but for others there may not be one. And that’s fine. This solution is not a 
“one-size-fits-all-states” proposal. It is a template for each state to react to or not as 
the state’s needs dictate. 
6. Maybe some homes should not be rebuilt 
Sometimes natural disaster survivors are asked, “Did you rebuild on the 
same lot?” To which the answer often is “yes,” because many homeowners 
understandably prefer to go home rather than move somewhere else and start over.264 
And, of course, the land the lost home sat upon is the only lot the homeowner owns. 
The questioner probably is asking a question about fear; after all, there is now at 
least one stark data point that this home’s location is a dangerous place for a home 
to be. 
 
 261. See, e.g., Bethan Moorcraft, Show Me the Money – Insurers See Benefits of 
Data and Analytics, INS. BUS. AMERICA (Apr. 22, 2021), https://www.insurancebusinessmag.
com/us/news/technology/show-me-the-money--insurers-see-benefits-of-data-and-analytics-
252994.aspx [https://perma.cc/9DDW-2NA4]; Ramnath Balusubramanian et al., Insurance 
2030—The Impact of AI on the Future of Insurance, MCKINSEY & CO. (Mar. 12, 2021), 
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/insurance-2030-the-
impact-of-ai-on-the-future-of-insurance# [https://perma.cc/K66L-MUM5]; Artificial 
Intelligence, NAIC (Oct. 30, 2020), https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_artificial_
intelligence.htm [https://perma.cc/6K8A-8JDD]; Big Data, NAIC (May 27, 2021), 
https://content.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_big_data.htm [https://perma.cc/LT5Y-DU7F]. 
 262. French, supra note 6, at 855. 
 263. Report Providing an Assessment of the Current State of the Market for Natural 
Catastrophe Insurance in the United States, supra note 7, at 15. 
 264. See Roadmap to Recovery Surveys, UNITED POLICYHOLDERS, 
http://uphelp.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2020) (click “Media,” then click “Survey Results;” 
consistently reporting over half of homeowners who have lost their home to a natural disaster 
intend to rebuild).  
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The data point frames a political Hobson’s Choice: No politician wants to 
publicly put hurdles in the path of victims getting home. That said, maybe one lesson 
from a flood, for example, is that building a home next to this particular river is the 
last place the politician should want homes to be built. Put simply, affordable, 
adequate, and available insurance in high-risk communities is not an unambiguous 
societal good.265 
This Article’s proposal cannot solve that political conundrum. This Article 
simply says that if building codes and zoning codes determine that homes can exist 
in a location, then here is a method to insure those homes in an adequate way. And 
it is a way to make sure that climate change survivors can get back home if 
politicians wish to support that choice. 
7. The cost of inaction 
Every political calculus has two sides (at least!) to the equation. A final 
factor in the political calculus should be the cost of inaction. Awareness of 
catastrophe risk destabilizes real-estate markets and makes property more 
expensive.266 As Governor Lael Brainard of the Federal Reserve remarked in March 
of 2021:  
[C]limate-related risks . . . could manifest as shocks or increase 
financial system vulnerabilities or both. One example is property and 
casualty insurance . . . . embedding vulnerabilities that could result in 
cascading losses in the event of large-scale adverse weather outcomes 
or other shocks to asset valuations. . . . As we have seen in California 
and in Florida, insurance companies can pull back from insuring 
properties and facilities in geographic areas subject to heightened 
flood or fire risk or seek to raise rates on these properties and facilities 
to more accurately reflect risks. Although such changes may 
ultimately result in a more accurate assessment of actual risks, the 
abrupt changes to a wide range of contracts that embed systemic 
mispricing could initially amplify the shock. It is also increasingly 
apparent that the value and, in some cases, the usability of real estate 
in many areas will be directly affected by the increased risks of flood, 
wildfires, severe storms, and sea-level rise associated with climate 
change. The direct effects on homeowners . . . can have severe effects 
on safety and the usability of properties. As climate risks grow over 
time, the mortgages on these properties may become riskier . . . .267  
 
 265.  Rebuilding for a Resilient Recovery, NEXT 10, 28 (June 
2021), https://www.next10.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Next10-Rebuilding-Resilient.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7NDK-JRCA] (arguing that there are some locations where post-wildfire 
homes should not be built or rebuilt). 
 266. Miyuki Hino & Marshall Burke, Does Information About Climate Risk Affect 
Property Values? (13 Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 26807, 2020), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26807. 
 268. Lael Brainard, Financial Stability Implications of Climate Change, Speech at 
“Transform Tomorrow Today” Ceres 2021 Conference, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS. 
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In sum, the political cost of inaction may well swamp any political costs of 
changing the current structure of insurance markets. 
CONCLUSION 
After Hurricane Harvey, the City of Houston found that the storm had 
caused an aggregate of $16 billion in property damage to residences; the economic 
impact was not distributed evenly; the storm was “especially hard” on people who 
already were “socially vulnerable;” only slightly more than $3 billion of that damage 
was covered by Federal assistance programs; “[a] majority of the remaining funds 
will be covered by non-Federal sources, such as private insurance, individual 
savings, or local recovery funds;” and there would be $2 billion—perhaps even $3 
billion—of “remaining unmet need for seriously damaged homes.”268 Houston’s 
experience with Hurricane Harvey is not extraordinary. It is emblematic of the new 
normal. There is an urgency for ubiquitously available, affordable private insurance 
for all perils. It is the only way home. This Article provides a path forward for that 
to occur. 
 
 269. The Harvey Data Project: City of Houston Housing and Community 
Development Department, supra note 225, at 7–12. 
